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ABSTRACT
The population plays a crucial role in the outcome of an insurgency. The government needs
intelligence from the population to effectively target and defeat the insurgents. In this thesis,
we adapt a vote-buying model from political science to the insurgency context to analyze the
level of intelligence the population will provide to the government. The model is a two-player
sequential game in which both the government and insurgents can “pay” individuals for their
support. These payments can take the form of direct bribes or the provision of benefits, such as
building schools and roads. In the model, an individual supports the government by providing
it with intelligence. We specify the optimal payment strategy for the insurgents and the govern-
ment and determine how much support the government will receive. In an extension to the base
model we allow the insurgents to use coercion as a means to deter individuals from supporting
the government. Our analysis illustrates that coercion can be an effective tool for the insurgents
in some situations but may backfire in others.
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Executive Summary
Recent insurgencies illustrate the crucial importance of incorporating the population into an
effective counterinsurgency strategy. The government needs intelligence from the population
to target the insurgents with force. The insurgents will take actions to prevent the flow of in-
telligence from the population to the government. These actions may include the provision of
benefits or threats of violence. In this thesis, we analyze the battle for the hearts and minds
of the population in an insurgency context. We formulate a mathematical model based on a
vote-buying model from political science. There is a natural connection between these two situ-
ations, as the government and insurgents vie for popular support just as two candidates would in
a standard election. The model is a two-player game where the government first makes an offer
to individuals in the population in return for intelligence. The insurgents observe the actions
taken by the government and make a counter-offer. These offers might be as simple and crude
as a monetary bribe, but they could be more complex. The insurgents or government might of-
fer benefits to the population including providing education, health care, security, and improved
infrastructures. Individuals consider the two offers and then accept the offer that provides them
with more value, while accounting for their innate preferences. Each individual may have ide-
ological tendencies that more naturally align with either the insurgents or the government. We
also incorporate the impact of coercion by the insurgents into the model. Finally, we examine
how the results differ when the population is a heterogeneous mix of individuals compared to a
population of only a small number of powerful tribes.
Our study primarily focuses on two issues: the minimum cost (or strength) required for the
government to “win” the popular support component of the counterinsurgency campaign, and
the level of support the government will receive if it wins. We also investigate situations where
coercion is an effective tool for the insurgents and situations where coercion may actually help
the government obtain more intelligence. Below we list the primary insights from the analysis
of the model.
If the government wins, it will receive more intelligence than is required to achieve victory.
This occurs because the insurgents are strategic and can easily undermine the government’s
support if it is only the minimum necessary for government victory. Examining the battle for
the hearts and minds from a decision analysis approach will lead to a different and incorrect
conclusion. As expected, the government is more likely to win if the intelligence requirement
is low or the insurgents are weak. The level of support obtained by the government increases
xiii
with the strength of the insurgents. This is another conclusion from the strategic analysis of the
problem. A strong insurgency will be able to poach supporters from the government, and so
the government needs to form a large base of support to prevent this. The government will also
gain more supporters if the population has weak preferences for the government or insurgents.
In this case it is less costly for the government to convince pro-insurgent individuals to provide
them with intelligence. The key insight about coercion is that it can be a double-edged sword
for the insurgents. In some situations it is an effective tool that silences government supporters.
However in other situations the insurgents may cause pro-insurgent individuals to provide the
government with intelligence because of their brazen use of violence. If the government wins
in the face of coercion, their level of support will increase. One of the main contributions of
this work is defining a weight to individuals in the population. This value can represent the
clout or influence an individual has in the population. Our results are sensitive to the specific
form of the weight function. Finally we examine a population comprised of a small number of
tribes, which is much more difficult to analyze then a heterogeneous population. We formulate
an optimization algorithm to solve for the optimal strategy of the government. The results for a
tribal population can differ significantly from the results corresponding to a population of many
independent and unique individuals. These last several observations suggest that care should be
taken when estimating the underlying structure of the society.
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The counterinsurgency campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere illustrate the difficulty in
fighting insurgents and the importance of having an effective counterinsurgency strategy. One
crucial way that counterinsurgency operations differ from conventional conflicts is the role of
population [1]. The population plays a critical role in insurgency situations: an insurgency can-
not sustain itself without popular support. The support may involve active aid to the insurgents:
recruits, finances, resources, sanctuary, etc [1]. However, the support to the insurgents may take
a more passive form, such as the population not providing the government with intelligence
about the insurgents’ location or tactics [1]. Mao Tse-tung captures the insurgents’ dependence
on the population in this quote: “The people are water, the Red Army are fish; without water,
the fish will die”[2]. Therefore, the government needs to incorporate the population into their
counterinsurgency strategy by focusing on weakening the connections between the insurgents
and population and fostering intelligence sources within the population [3]. In this thesis we
primarily focus on the latter.
Policymakers recognize the important role that the population plays in gaining vital intelli-
gence for the government [FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency]. In his March 17, 2005, Congressional
testimony, Executive Director of Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments Andrew F.
Krepinevich has stated:
In conventional warfare, the enemy’s military forces are often seen as its center of
gravity. . . This is not the case in insurgency warfare, where the population is
the center of gravity. Defeating them (insurgents) requires time, both to provide
counterinsurgent forces with an understanding of the environment in which the
insurgent forces are operating, and to win the hearts and minds of the population,
which will produce the human intelligence needed to distinguish the enemy from
noncombatants. . . The key to defeating an insurgency is to attack it at the source of
its strength: the population. If the counterinsurgent forces can deny the insurgents
access to the people, the insurgents become like fish out of water, denied sources
of manpower and information.
The most impressive example of the population impacting counterinsurgency operations oc-
curred in Anbar during Operation Iraqi Freedom. During a September 2007 visit to Anbar
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Province in western Iraq, President George W. Bush stated, “Anbar is a huge province. It was
once written off as lost. It is now one of the safest places in Iraq.” [5]. The reason for this
remarkable reversal was that individuals “who once fought side by side with al Qaeda against
coalition troops [are] now fighting side by side with coalition troops against al Qaeda” [5].
While there are many factors that determine who “wins” an insurgency conflict, we focus in this
thesis on the aspect discussed in the preceding paragraphs: winning the hearts and minds of the
population. More specifically we concentrate on the government acquiring enough intelligence
so that they can effectively target the insurgents with force. In our model, we assume that if
the government obtains enough intelligence from the population then they win the battle for
the population, otherwise the insurgents win. The outcome of this component of the conflict
then directly influences the larger counterinsurgency campaign. Thus, the core of our model is
that the government is going to take actions to increase the amount of intelligence it receives,
while the insurgents are a strategic adversary that will counteract the tactics of the government
to minimize the intelligence flowing to the government from the population.
We formulate a mathematical model based on a vote-buying model from political science [6].
There is a natural connection between these two situations. In our context, the government
and insurgents vie for popular support just as two candidates for president would in a standard
election. The model is a two-player game where the government first makes an offer to indi-
viduals in the population in return for intelligence. The insurgents observe the actions taken
by the government and make a counter-offer. These offers might be as simple and crude as a
monetary bribe (and this is how we will denote it throughout the thesis), but they could be more
complex. The insurgents or government might offer benefits to the population including provid-
ing education, health care, security, and improved infrastructures. Individuals consider the two
offers and then accept the offer that provides them with more value, while accounting for their
innate preferences. Each individual may have ideological tendencies that more naturally align
with either the insurgents or the government. We also incorporate the impact of coercion by the
insurgents into the model. Finally, we examine how the results differ when the population is a
heterogeneous mix of individuals compared to a population of only a small number of powerful
tribes.
One of the main contributions of this thesis is to frame an insurgency situation within a vote-
buying framework. After formulating the vote-buying game, we specify the complete equilib-
rium of the game. As with most attacker-defender type games, the government will provide a
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bribe to individuals such that most are equally costly to the insurgents to counter-bribe. To win,
the government must obtain support from more individuals than is necessary for the government
to achieve victory. This occurs because it prevents the insurgents from being able to mount a
winning counter-offer. We incorporate the impact of coercion and study cases where it is an
effective tool for the insurgents. However, coercion can be a double-edged sword and there are
situations where it backfires on the insurgents and makes it more likely that the government will
win. Most of the analysis assumes that the population consists of a continuum of individuals.
However to examine the case where the population comprises a handful of tribes we must mod-
ify the model, which produces a much more complicated formulation. While we derive limited
analytic insights from this discrete model, we do provide a numerical approach to solve it.
The rest of thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we discuss the literature related to
this problem and our modeling approach. The bulk of the thesis appears in Chapter 3, which
provides a more thorough explanation of the background and motivation of the model as well
as the initial model formulation and its extensions. We illustrate the model and its results in
Chapter 4 before concluding in Chapter 5 with a discussion of the results, shortcomings of the
model, and potential future work. Technical details supporting the results in Chapter 3 appear
in the Appendix.
3
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CHAPTER 2:
Background Research and Literature Review
We formulate a two-player sequential game to gain insight about the competition between the
government and insurgents for the support of the general population. We do this by adapting
a vote-buying model from political science by Groseclose and Snyder [6]. Before discussing
the vote-buying literature in general in Section 2.3 and the Groseclose and Snyder model in
particular in Section 2.4, we discuss two related topics. In Section 2.1, we present an overview
of auction literature and in Section 2.2 we discuss Colonel Blotto games. Finally, we discuss
counterinsurgency and social dynamics in Sections 2.5 and 2.6, respectively.
2.1 Auction Theory
The original motivation of this thesis was that in a simplified world, the government and in-
surgents were bidders in an auction and they would bid for the support of individual tribes.
Through reading the auction literature, primarily [7], we uncovered the vote-buying literature.
This line of works seems a more natural fit than standard auction theory. While vote buying
may differ from traditional auctions, it has similarities with nonstandard auctions. Krishna [8]
overviews auction theory with an extensive survey of the field. In the literature there are four
“standard” auctions studied: the ascending-bid auction (English auction), the descending-bid
auction (Dutch auction), the first-price sealed-bid auction and the second-price sealed-bid auc-
tion (i.e., the Vickrey auction) [9]. Along with these standard auctions, there are a myriad of
other theoretical and practical auction settings investigated by various studies. See Krishna and
Morgan [10] and Che and Gale [11, 12] for recent studies that investigate the theory of non-
standard auction formats. The two types of auctions that are the most relevant for our purposes
are the war of attrition and the all-pay auction. Definitions of these non-standard auctions are
given in Krishna and Morgan [10] as follows:
These auction forms share the common feature that all losing bidders pay exactly
their bids and differ only in the amounts paid by the winning bidder. In the [war of
attrition auction], the winning bidder pays the second highest bid; whereas in the
[all-pay auction], the winner pays his own bid. As such, they are analogous to the
standard second-price and first-price sealed bid auctions, respectively.
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Models for conflict among animals and insects [13, 14], survival among firms [15] , arms race
[16], R&D competitions [17] and lobbying [7, 18, 19] are some of the examples where war
of attrition and all-pay auctions are used analyze underlying games [10]. Vote-buying can be
modeled as an all-pay auction because all parties have to pay for the vote whether they win
or lose [7, 18, 19]. Election manipulation via campaign promises or clientelism resembles a
standard first-price auction where the losing parties do not need to pay [7, 20].
2.2 Colonel Blotto Games
The Colonel Blotto game captures strategic situations in which players simultaneously allocate
forces to various cells on a battlefield. A side wins a cell if it allocates more force to the
cell than its adversary [21]. The battle for popular support of the general population during
an insurgency can be can be interpreted as a Blotto Game where the government will receive
support from a tribe if they provide that tribe with more utility (e.g., payments, health-care,
schools, infrastructure) than the insurgents do.
First proposed by Borel [22] in 1921 and solved for the special case of three battlefields, classic
Blotto games are difficult to solve, due to the simultaneous nature of the interaction. Gross and
Wagner [23] provide a solution for a finite number of battlefields if the players have symmetric
resources. Friedman [24] provides a partial characterization of the solution to the problem for
n-battlefields and asymmetric resources. More recently, Roberson [25] has applied the theory
of copulas to prove the uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs for finite number of battlefields with
players having arbitrary asymmetric resources [26].
Gerchak and Parlar [27] examine the allocation of resources to R&D activities in an uncertain
and competitive environment with winner-takes-all payoffs. Instead of the assuming the party
that allocates a larger force than the other captures the payoff with probability 1, they investigate
the case where the probability of capturing the payoff is a function of the bids of the rivals. They
provide an optimal resource allocation between two activities conditional on the competitor’s
allocation and characterize the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria for that model. Our formulation
follows the initial Blotto model in that the outcome for each tribe is binary: one side completely
wins support from the tribe. In practice, both the insurgents and the government may receive
support from the same tribe. Thus future work will incorporate the ideas of [27] to split the
support of the tribes. In the base model, the population is a continuum and there are no tribes,
but just individuals. Therefore, this formulation captures in a rough sense a tribe that splits its
support between the government and insurgents.
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The closest study to our work is done by Powell [28], who examines the strategic allocation of
resources across multiple fronts in the context of nonzero sum Blotto games. In his formulation,
as in our formulation, the players sequentially select their allocations. This variation makes the
problem much more tractable. The defender first places defense assets around targets, and
then the attacker chooses how much attack resources to allocate to each target. He shows that
unlike many Blotto games which only have very complicated mixed-strategy equilibria, the
sequential, nonzero-sum Blotto game has a pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibrium. The
defender always plays the same pure strategy, and the attacker’s response is generally unique
and entails no mixing.
2.3 Vote Buying Models
Our model is most closely related to vote buying model of Groseclose and Snyder (GS) [6].
Groseclose and Snyder presents a model of vote buying in a legislature. They examine the equi-
librium coalition size with preferences of the legislators and vote buyers in a sequential game.
We dedicate section 2.4 specifically to their study and defer the further discussion of this paper
until then. While the Groseclose and Snyder model primarily focuses on a continuum of voters,
Banks [29] and Dippel [30] analyze the discrete-voter population and identify how the optimal
coalition size varies with the underlying preference parameters. They derive the necessary and
sufficient conditions for minimal majority and universal coalitions to form. Their findings are
consistent with the original Groseclose and Snyder model. However, the key assumption in
[29, 30] is that all voters have equal weight. While that is a natural and reasonable assumption
in most cases, it may be a poor assumption when considering tribal societies. Therefore, we
consider a population where individuals or tribes have different weights. While the results of
the continuous version of this model are quite similar to the Groseclose and Snyder model, the
discrete version is much different and more complicated to analyze.
Dekel and coauthors have two papers that examine vote buying scenarios [7, 31]. The work in
[7] analyzes simultaneous-move vote buying, where voters care about how they cast their vote
and not about the eventual outcome. This is common in legislatures where individuals want to be
reelected and thus only care about how their constituents perceive their vote. In their companion
paper [31], they compare the vote manipulation process of using campaign promises vs. direct
payments. Payments are contingent on the vote, whereas campaign promises are contingent
on the outcome of the election. They find that direct vote buying provides far less total social
benefits than campaign promises. It would be interesting to incorporate a concept similar to
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campaign promises in [31] in future extensions of the model in this thesis.
Morgan and Va´rdy [32] investigate the ease with which various voting bodies can be bought.
Their main result suggests that large voting bodies are more difficult to buy if only one party
is trying to buy the election. This is intuitive. However, they argue that if multiple parties are
trying to buy the election then it might be possible that buying larger voting bodies is actually
easier. They evaluate potential countermeasures to vote buying and conclude that the secret
ballot is an effective strategy. Several other articles look at other means to manipulate voting
[33, 32, 20]. These include payments to individuals to show up to the polls (turnout buying), but
not contracting on the actual vote. Morgan and Va´rdy [33] investigate a vote buying situation
in which players can pay voters to abstain (negative turnout buying). They argue that such
vote manipulation is never optimal under an open ballot, but can be effective under a secret
ballot. Examining negative turnout buying is not appropriate in our context. An individual has
two choices: provide intelligence to the government or stay silent. There is no equivalent to
“staying home on election day.” Finally, as we discuss in Chapter 3, we feel that an open ballot
assumption is reasonable for an insurgency situation.
Along with the the theoretical voting models, there are numerous studies that investigate em-
pirical results of vote buying. Heckelman [34] examines the effects of secrecy in the voting
process. He compares election turnouts for each state before and after the adoption of a se-
cret ballot. He shows that the secret ballot accounts for a 7 percent decrease in voter turnout.
Callahan and McCargo [35] argue that money was the decisive factor in the July 1995 election
in Thailand. Vicente [36] studies the effects of vote-buying in elections under a secret ballot.
Results of his study on the general elections in newly oil-rich Sao Tome and Principe (Western
Africa) suggest that vote-buying increases voter turnout and is a tactic often utilized by a chal-
lenger to counteract the incumbency advantage. This result concurs with the theoretical results
of Groseclose and Snyder [6], where the player who moves second (who can be viewed as the
incumbent) has a strategic advantage in the game.
In our study, we model coercion as a tool for the insurgents. In their study on violence during
election campaigns, Collier and Vicente [37] separate the supporters of rival political parties
into two main groups: hardcore and soft base supporters. They assume that coercion effectively
eliminates soft base supporters. They are too intimidated to provide support. Hardcore support-
ers, however, will still continue to provide support even in the face of coercion. They show that
weaker candidates will resort to violence (what they call terrorism). We find a similar result,
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although our formulation of coercion is different than in [37]. They model coercion as a binary
decision variable, whereas we allow the insurgents to vary the coercion level over a continuum.
Furthermore, we do not distinguish between soft base and hardcore supporters, although it has
potential to be incorporated in further extensions of our model. In our model, the coercion
modifies the preferences of the entire society instead of just affecting the soft base supporters.
There are a wide range of social science studies that also investigate the existence and results
of voter intimidation. Schedler [38] investigates the totalitarian regimes that hold elections and
argues that if power and money determine electoral choices, then democratic freedom does not
exist. Violence or the threat of it can keep voters from exercising free choice. Kriger [39]
examines the general elections in Zimbabwe and describes methods used to coerce voters:
Methods of coercion against voters are extended from brutal “disciplining murders”
as examples of the fate awaiting those who failed to conform, to generalized threats
of retribution or a continuance or resumption of the war; to psychological pressures
like name-taking and claims to the possession of machines which would reveal how
individuals had voted; and to the physical interdiction of attendance at meetings.
The universal longing for peace, and the ambience of recent violence, made the
threats of general retribution or a continuance of the war a potent weapon even in
the hands of unarmed activists, since it was independent of the secrecy of the ballot.
2.4 Groseclose and Snyder Model
We base our initial model on the work of Groseclose and Snyder [6] (henceforth referred to as
just GS) and thus much of our base model is similar to their model. GS examine a continuum
of voters who have some initial preference for voting for each candidate (or opposite sides of a
bill). The candidates move sequentially with the challenger making the initial “bribe” offer and
the incumbent moving second with a counter-bribe after observing the bribe of the challenger.
They assume that the challenger is sufficiently strong to achieve victory (we do not make this
assumption) and they examine the type of bribe offered by the challenger, how much it will cost
the challenger to win, and the resulting support the challenger receives when he wins. The novel
result from this work is that the winner will receive more than a majority of votes, and hence
the term “supermajority” in the title of their paper. When both sides can offer bribes to the
population, the winning side needs to have a sufficient buffer of voters to ensure his opponent
cannot make a winning counter-bribe.
We describe our model in Chapter 3, and the base model closely parallels the GS model. One
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of the goals of this thesis is to examine the insurgency scenario with a new modeling approach
and lay the groundwork for future research. Aside from context and focus there are two main
differences in our base model and the GS model
1. We examine an arbitrary victory threshold, whereas GS assume victory occurs with a
majority of the votes.
2. In GS each individual has the same weight. This can be viewed as clout, or power,
or influence; essentially one person, one vote. In our model we introduce a weighting
function over the population such that different individuals have different influence on the
outcome. This allows us to model the social structure of tribal areas in a more realistic
fashion.
We then extend our base model in ways that do not appear in the GS paper. We incorporate
coercion as an active parameter in the model. We also analyze the discrete population which
receives little attention in GS. As mentioned in Section 2.3, the discrete version that examines
weighted tribes is a much more complicated problem than what GS and others [29, 30] have
studied.
2.5 Counterinsurgency Theory
Insurgents’ dependence on popular support has been investigated in numerous recent studies.
Gaga [40] examines historical evidence that suggests that the loss of support can hasten the
demise of a terrorist group. His results concur with Crenshaw [41] who argues “cooperation
or acquiescence from terrorists’ erstwhile supporters gives the state better control over the op-
erational terrain through improved access and intelligence, leading to greater terrorist attrition
and disrupting their operations and organization.” In his study on support for terrorism, Paul
[42] examines how terrorists generate and maintain support and argues that “many of the same
factors that motivate terrorist recruitment also motivate broad popular support for terrorists.”
He suggests that before developing and implementing an overarching plan to undermine the
insurgents’ support base, the government should identify the type of group, the extent of each
group’s support needs, and how it obtains these needs. Metz and Millen [43] investigate the
“bandwagon” effect and argue that large segments of a population throw their support behind
the side they believe will win. Helmus et al. [44] investigate the relationship between popular
support and benefits provided to society, and they argue that provision of social services by the
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insurgents has been found to be very effective in generating positive opinions, endorsement,
and support for the insurgents. Flanigan [45] further notes that areas where a terrorist or insur-
gent group is the only provider of such services contain the highest levels of support for such
organizations.
In our game, we assume that the insurgents have an objective and will behave in a manner to
achieve that objective. Thus, there is some assumption of rationality regarding the insurgents
and we must ensure this is a legitimate assumption. Berebi [46] argues that “terrorists are
not particularly poor, ignorant, mentally ill, or religious. Their most notable characteristic is
normalcy.” He shows that at the tactical level, the evidence tends to support rational decision
making by terrorists. Ganor [47], suggests that “In general, terrorist organizations usually con-
duct rational considerations of costs and benefits, but they often attribute different weight to the
values taken into account in their cost-benefit calculations, and occasionally, may even consider
values that are different from those of the ones coping with terrorism, thus making a decision
that appears irrational to an outside observer.” This observation agrees with Simon [48].
Several recent works have attempted to model the role of the population in insurgencies. Kress
and Szechtman [49] examine the role collateral damage plays in strengthening an insurgency.
They observe that the likelihood of collateral damage makes it extremely difficult to completely
defeat an insurgency using only military force. The authors more explicitly model the popu-
lation as a central player in insurgency situations in [50]. Here the government and insurgents
provide benefits to the population, and the insurgents can coerce the population. The insurgents’
ability to effectively coerce the population depends upon the intelligence they receive from their
supporters. This leads to tipping points in the population. We also consider coercion and an
imperfect ability for the insurgents to target the coercion. However, the coercion effectiveness
parameter in our model is static. Epstein and Gang [51] analyze the counterinsurgency situation
in which there are multiple insurgent groups vying for control of the general population along
with the government. They examine who benefits when the insurgent groups share one common
cause. Berman et al. [52] model the insurgency as a three-way interaction between insurgents
seeking political change through violence, a government trying to minimize violence through
some combination of service provision and force, and individuals deciding whether or not to
provide the government with intelligence.
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2.6 Social Structure in Afghanistan
Even though we primarily focus on the insurgency situation in Afghanistan, our model is gen-
eral enough to apply to different insurgency situations. Our model can handle a social structure
that consists of a handful of homogeneous tribes or a fairly heterogeneous population. As we
will see the weight function can have a significant impact on the results, so it is important to
explicitly model the population structure and not just assume every individual or tribe has equal
clout. Unfortunately studies about the general social structure in Afghanistan have conflict-
ing conclusions. A 2009 US ARMY TRADOC report [53] argues that the tribal structure in
Afghanistan is not as strong as many believe, and counterinsurgency strategies that worked in a
highly tribal Iraq may not work in Afghanistan. Another report by Gant [54] claims that success
in Afghanistan depends crucially on dealing with the tribes because they have significant con-
trol over the population. Giustozzi [55] takes a more moderate view and argues that importance




In this chapter, we describe the model. We first discuss the settings and assumptions in Section
3.1. In Section 3.2, we present the initial model, and in Sections 3.3 and 3.4, we formulate
extensions to the model that account for coercion and discrete populations, respectively. Most
of the technical details appear in the Appendix.
3.1 Settings and Assumptions
We examine an insurgency situation where the the insurgents are in control of a region and
government forces seek to defeat them. An example of this situation can be found in certain
areas of Afghanistan in 2011. While the nature of this conflict is quite complex, we analyze only
one part of it: the battle for the hearts and minds of the population. The insurgents need support
from the population in terms of resources, recruits, and safe haven [40, 42]. The government
needs the population’s support primarily in the form of intelligence to effectively target the
insurgents. In this model, we assume that the government “wins” the battle for the population
if it receives intelligence from at least some certain fraction of the population. Otherwise the
insurgents win, and therefore the outcome is binary. For example, if the threshold is 40%, then
the government will win if it receives intelligence from at least 40% of the population, otherwise
the insurgents win. This is of course an oversimplification, but it allows us to gain initial insight
into the problem. We discuss this and other shortcomings in Chapter 5.
To model this interaction between the government and insurgent, we adapt a vote-buying model
by Groseclose and Snyder (GS) [6]. In GS two individuals are running for office (or two parties
are on opposite sides of a bill) and they can pay voters for their vote. In our model the govern-
ment and the insurgents pay (i.e., bribe) the population for support. We define support for the
government as providing it with intelligence. As in GS we formulate a two player, two period,
sequential game. The government moves first and chooses an amount to bribe each individual
in the population. The insurgents observe this bribe and then make a counter-bribe. We assume
this sequence partly for analytic tractability, but also because it gives the insurgents a strategic
advantage. If the insurgents are entrenched in an area, they have no incentive to take action until
after observing the bribe of the government. While we define the strategies of the government
and insurgents as bribes and counterbribes, respectively, the actual transfers do not necessarily
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need to take this crude form. The government or insurgents could be providing benefits such as
food, medical services, security etc.
Each individual in the population has an initial net-preference for providing intelligence to
the government. This preference level can be negative, in which case the individual prefers
staying silent. In the model, if an individuals stays silent they are supporting the insurgents. An
individual compares the bribe offered by the government with the counter-bribe offered by the
insurgents and, in conjunction with his initial preference, accepts the bribe from the side who
provides him with the most value (i.e., utility) and offers his support. If enough individuals
support the government, then the government wins, otherwise the insurgents win.
The insurgents and government put a certain value on achieving victory in the population do-
main. There are several potential interpretations of this value. This could represent a budget
constraint on the amount of bribes each side can offer. Or it could represent the amount each
side is feasibly willing to spend to win. The battle for the population is just one component of
the insurgency conflict, and so each side cannot afford to spend an arbitrarily large amount on
gaining the population’s support. We prefer the latter interpretation. Under this interpretation,
the valuation of victory corresponds to a measure of strength for each side.
We assume the government moves first because the insurgents are currently entrenched in the
region and the government must actively engage with the population to gather intelligence.
After observing the tactics of the government, the insurgents will counter. However, the insur-
gents have no incentive to preemptively bribe the population before the government tangibly
manifests itself as a threat.
As discussed in GS, the net-preference level of an individual does not reflect an individual’s
preference for who wins if one individual is a negligible fraction of the population. In this
situation, one person’s actions will not affect the outcome (i.e., the probability an individual is
pivotal is essentially zero [6]). Thus, the net-preference level reflects an individual’s utility from
the act of providing intelligence to the government, after the cost of cooperation is discounted.
This could reflect satisfaction from providing the location of an insurgent hideout to the gov-
ernment or perhaps guilt or shame from not providing assistance. The preference function can
also capture fear of retaliation from the insurgents for those who cooperate with the govern-
ment, although we more explicitly model coercion in Section 3.3. For a discrete population (see
Section 3.4) the preference level can account for who an individual prefers to win because that
individual can influence the outcome. A potential extension to this work would incorporate the
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concept of conferring benefits on the population contingent on victory, which is similar to the
campaign promise model of [31].
One important issue with traditional vote-buying is the credibility in the transaction. That is the
voter can take a candidate’s money, and if the voter cannot be effectively monitored then the
voter can still vote for whoever she prefers, regardless of the payment. With the adoption of the
secret ballot in many elections, classic vote-buying cannot be enforced [33, 32, 20]. However,
we assume that the once an individual commits to a side by accepting their bribe the individual
will follow through with the support. This is reasonable from the government’s perspective:
the government directly observes whether an individual provides intelligence and can make
the bribe contingent on receiving the intelligence. The insurgents’ ability to confirm that an
individual is not providing intelligence to the government may not be as strong. However, we
assume that the insurgents have intelligence that allows them to determine (perhaps imperfectly)
who in the population reneges on the agreement and provides information to the government.
We assume individuals do not want to face the consequences of taking the insurgents’ bribe and
then providing intelligence to the government.
We defer discussing the validity of the assumptions and other model shortcomings until in
Chapter 5.
3.2 Base Model
In this section, we describe the base model and the solution to the two player game. The initial
formulation modifies the GS model to fit within the insurgency context. The two modifications
we make to the GS framework in this section are (1) having an arbitrary victory threshold (as
opposed to majority), and (2) each individual has his own weight in which he can influence the
outcome (in GS individuals have equal weight). We first present the model preliminaries and
notation in Section 3.2.1. We next define the insurgent and government strategies in Sections
3.2.2–3.2.3. Finally we present the complete solution to the game in Section 3.2.4 and provide
some analysis of the solution in Section 3.2.5.
3.2.1 Preliminaries
To achieve victory, the government requires a fraction L of the population to provide it with
intelligence. We discuss the limitations of this assumption further in Chapter 5. We assume
that there is a continuum of individuals and we parametrize individuals in the population by




] (as in GS). An individual
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θ has weight w(θ) and net-preference v(θ) for the government. As discussed in Section 3.1,
this preference represents the utility an individual derives from providing the government with
intelligence. If the preference value is negative, then the individual inherently prefers supporting
the insurgents by not providing intelligence to the government. We assume v(θ) is in monetary
units to be consistent with the monetary bribes provided by the government and insurgents.
Hence utility is linear in money in this formulation. The total cost required to convince an
individual to change his support is |v(θ)w(θ)dθ|. That is, if an individual inherently prefers the
insurgents such that the v(θ) < 0, then the government would need to bribe this individual with
an amount of at least−v(θ)w(θ)dθ to convince him to provide the government with intelligence
(presuming the insurgents do not offer a counter-bribe).
As in GS, we sort the individuals in the population in nonincreasing order by their preference
v(θ). Thus, θ = −1
2
is the most pro-government individual, and θ = 1
2
correspond to the most
pro-insurgent individual. We assume the weight function is defined by some continuous density




] with corresponding CDFW (θ). We will define v(θ) as a strictly decreasing
continuous function, because the weight function can account for multiple individuals with
nearly identical preferences. The individual defined by θN = v−1(0) has neutral preferences
(i.e., is indifferent between supporting the government and insurgents). All individuals with
θ < θL = W
−1(L) represent the fraction L of the population with the most pro-government
preferences. Thus, if θL < θN , the government will receive enough support to win if the
insurgents do not offer any counter-bribes. Otherwise the government needs to make an initial
bribe to some individuals in order to win.
We model the interaction as a two stage sequential game. In the first stage, the government
makes a bribe to the population. Where governments bribing strategy, bG(·) is a function of
θ. In the second stage, the insurgents observe the bribe of the government and offer a counter-
bribe bI(θ). If an individual θ accepts the government’s bribe, he will provide intelligence to the
government and receive utility v(θ) + bG(θ). Otherwise, he accepts the insurgents’ bribe, does
not provide intelligence to the government, and receives utility bI(θ). Therefore, the government
will only receive intelligence from an individual if v(θ) + bG(θ) > bI(θ). The outcome of the
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game is thus








The objective of the game for both the government and insurgents is to win at the lowest cost.
However, the government values the victory at VG and the insurgents value the victory at VI . If
the cost to achieve victory is greater than its valuation, the side prefers to concede rather than
obtain a costly victory. As discussed in Section 3.1, the quantities VG and VI are a measure of
the strengths of the government and insurgents, respectively.
We summarize the notation of the model in Table 3.1.
Parameter Description
L amount of support the government needs for victory
θ parameter corresponding to an arbitrary individual in the population
v(θ) preference function of population for government
w(θ) weight function of population
W (θ) CDF corresponding to w(θ)
θN = v
−1(0), parameter of individual that has neutral preferences
θL
= W−1(L),
the Lth percentile of the population in terms of their preference for the government
bG(θ) government bribe function
bI(θ) insurgent counter-bribe function
VG the value the government places on victory (strength of government)
VI the value the insurgents places on victory (strength of insurgents)
SG support government would receive in absence of insurgent counter-bribe
m government bribe parameter (see Sections 3.2.3)
H(m) height of leveling bribe (see Section 3.2.3)
TG(m) cost to implement government bribe (see Section 3.2.3)
α insurgents’ level of coercion
p situational awareness parameter related to coercion (see Section 3.3.2)
Table 3.1: Model Notation
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Next, we define several terms to distinguish between the concepts of attitude and behavior. An
individual’s attitude is dictated by his religion, cultural background, tribal affiliation, etc., and
we assume it is fixed throughout. In our model, an individual’s attitude is either pro-insurgent or
pro-government. The behavior of an individual is how they act, and in our model it is manifested
by whether whether he supports the government or support the insurgents. That is providing (or
withholding) intelligence determines behavior. The attitude and behavior of an individual need
not coincide. See [50] for a further discussion of attitude and behavior. Below we define these
terms to clearly denote how they will be used throughout this chapter.
Definition 1. pro-government: An individual parameterized by θ is pro-government if v(θ) > 0
Definition 2. pro-insurgent: An individual parameterized by θ is pro-insurgent if v(θ) < 0
Definition 3. government supporter: An individual supports the government if they will provide
the government with intelligence. That is if v(θ) + bG(θ) > bI(θ).
Definition 4. insurgent supporter: An individual supports the insurgents if they do not provide
intelligence to the government. That is if v(θ) + bG(θ) ≤ bI(θ).
In the remainder of this section, we examine the equilibrium of this game and the optimal
strategy of each side. As this section is primarily modifying the GS model into the insurgency
context, some of the analysis borrows heavily from their work. Where appropriate, we will
point out the similarities. As the insurgents move first, we first examine their best response to
the government in Section 3.2.2. We next examine the government’s optimal bribe in Section
3.2.3. This is the primary focus of the GS work, so this section most closely resembles their
paper. We specify the complete equilibrium of the game in Section 3.2.4 and perform some
additional analysis in Section 3.2.5
3.2.2 Insurgent Strategy
To solve this two player game, we first examine the insurgents, who move second. In the first
period the government offers a bribe bG(θ). If insurgents do not offer a counter-bribe, the





We will initially ignore the constraint VI and assume the insurgents will always make a winning
counter-bribe. The insurgents will choose the lowest cost counter-bribe bI(θ) such that the
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bI(θ) ≥ 0 (3.3c)
The optimal strategy for the insurgents is a greedy strategy, in which they bribe the weakest
supporters of the government. The following proposition summarizes this strategy.
Proposition 1. The lowest cost counter-bribe for the insurgents to win is to give a counter-bribe
bI(θ) = v(θ) + bG(θ) to all individuals defined by the set {θ : 0 < v(θ) + bG(θ) < T} and to
some subset of the individuals defined by the set {θ : v(θ) + bG(θ) = T} for some threshold
value T .
The proof of this appears in Section A.3 of the Appendix. Proposition 1 describes a simple
strategy for the insurgents: sweep out the value T and counter-bribe everyone who requires less
than T to stop providing intelligence to the government. Eventually, for large enough T , the
insurgents will counter-bribe enough individuals such that the total fraction of the population
providing intelligence to the government will drop below L. The optimal strategy defined by
Proposition 1 is intuitive, but it does not hold in the discrete case (see Section 3.4).
Proposition 1 describes a lowest cost counter-bribe to achieve victory in terms of some threshold
T , some set D, and a counter-bribe bI(θ) for θ ∈ D. For more details on the specific form of T
and D see Section A.3 of the Appendix. The insurgents will execute this counter-bribe and win
if the total cost of the counter-bribe is less than the insurgents’ value of winning, VI . Proposition
2 summarizes this.
Proposition 2. Suppose the government makes a bribe bG(θ) and a lowest cost counter-bribe
by the insurgents involves bribing some set D of the population. Then the optimal response of
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the insurgents is to bid bI(θ) given by
bI(θ) =0 if SG ≤ L (3.4a)
bI(θ) =0 if SG > L and
∫
D
(v(θ) + bG(θ))w(θ)dθ ≥ VI (3.4b)
bI(θ) =v(θ) + bG(θ) for θ ∈ D if SG > L and
∫
D
(v(θ) + bG(θ))w(θ)dθ < VI (3.4c)
The proof and the exact form of the set D appear in section A.3 of the Appendix. We more
explicitly write out the insurgents’ best response in Section 3.2.4 when we fully describe the
equilibria of the game. Case (3.4a) of Proposition 2 corresponds to the situation where the
insurgents win without needing to make a counter-bribe. Otherwise, the insurgents determine
who they need to counter-bribe to win at the lowest cost according to Proposition 1. If this
costs less than VI , the insurgents execute a counter-bribe of bI(θ) = v(θ) + bG(θ) to this set of
individuals and 0 to everyone else and win. This corresponds to case (3.4c). If the cost is more
than VI , victory is too costly so the insurgents do not offer a counter-bribe to anyone, and the
government wins. This corresponds to case (3.4b).
3.2.3 Government Strategy
When analyzing the government’s optimal bribe, there are several things to consider. First,
the government must determine the lowest cost bribe it can offer and win. To do this it needs
to decide who to bribe and how much to offer. After calculating the lowest cost bribe, the
government next needs to determine if the bribe is worth the cost to implement it. In this
section, we first describe the general form of the government’s optimal bribe. We then specify
the exact relationships necessary to produce the lowest cost winning bribe for the government.
General Government Strategy
As in section 3.2.2, we first assume that the constraint of VG is not a factor and that the govern-
ment will choose a bribing strategy b∗G(θ) that results in a victory at the lowest cost. We first
define a particular type of bribe by adopting the terminology in GS:
Definition 5. leveling bribe (or strategy): A bribe bG(θ) by the government is a leveling bribe
if there is a constant a such that v(θ) + bG(θ) = a for all individuals the government bribes.
Figure 3.1 illustrates a leveling bribe. Bribes of this type are relevant because all individuals
for θ ∈ [θ0,m] in Figure 3.1 cost the insurgents the same amount to successfully counter-bribe.
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This figure is similar to Figure 1 in GS.












θ0 θN θL m
v(θ) + bG(θ) = v(θ0)
Figure 3.1: Leveling Strategy
The next proposition states thats the government’s low-cost bribe can always be constructed as
a leveling bribe.
Proposition 3. An optimal bribe of the government can always be constructed as a leveling
bribe. That is the bribe b∗G(θ) satisfies v(θ) + b
∗
G(θ) = a for θ ∈ [v−1(a),m] for some a and m.
Furthermore m ≥ θN .
The proof of this appears in Section A.4.1 of the Appendix. The intuition behind Proposition 3
is straightforward. The game is attacker/defender in nature and thus the insurgents will “attack
the weak points” in the government’s coalition under bG(θ) (see Proposition 1). Therefore, the
insurgents’ strategic advantage in moving second naturally leads to a leveling strategy by the
government in the first period. Moreover, Figure 3.1 illustrates that in many situations the indi-
viduals with moderate preferences may receive most of the payments, while those with extreme
preferences receive nothing. The extremely pro-government individuals do not need any addi-
tional incentives to support the government, and the extremely pro-insurgent individuals are too
expensive to include in the government coalition.
Note that Proposition 3 states that if the insurgents win they can always enact an optimal leveling
bribe. However, in some situations there are nonleveling bribes that would also be optimal.
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That is they cost the same to the government to implement and the lowest cost response by the
insurgents costs the same as the counter-bribe to the leveling strategy. We will focus exclusively
on the leveling bribe strategies of the government as it is optimal and intuitive. Although later
in this section we will mention a situation where other optimal bribes exist.
We will now describe the four scenarios the government faces and what the form of the optimal
bribe will be in each case. Recall we currently assume that VG is large enough so that the
government can win. By Proposition 3 the government will receive support from individuals
for θ ∈ [−1
2
,m] for some m ≥ θN . Let us redefine the level of support for the government in






For the insurgents to win, they need to make a compelling counter-bribe tomax{0, SG(m)−L}
of the government supporters. To do this, the insurgents could bribe the individuals for θ ∈
[θL,m] (see Corollary 2 in Section A.3 of the Appendix).
The following proposition describes the possible scenarios faced by the government when it
wins. This proposition corresponds to Proposition 1 in GS (although it is framed within our
context). The description of the 4 cases is notationally tedious. However, the cases are intuitive
and we explain these four cases graphically after the proposition. It may be easier to refer to
those figures rather than the notation in the proposition.
Proposition 4. Define b∗G(θ) to be a government’s optimal bribe. One of the following four
scenarios describes this optimal bribe.
1. If θL < θN and VI ≤
∫ θN
θL
v(θ)w(θ)dθ, then b∗G(θ) = 0.
2. If θL < θN and
∫ θN
θL
v(θ)w(θ)dθ ≤ VI ≤ v(θL)
∫ θN
θL
w(θ)dθ, then there exists an optimal
leveling bribe b∗G(θ) such that v(θ) + b
∗
G(θ) = a ≤ v(θL) for θ ∈ [v−1(a), θN ] and
b∗G(θ) = 0 for θ /∈ [v−1(a), θN ]. The value a satisfies
∫ θN
θL
max(a, v(θ))w(θ)dθ = VI .
3. If θL < θN and VI > v(θL)
∫ θN
θL
w(θ)dθ then there is some leveling strategy b∗G(θ) such
that b∗G(θ) =
VI










on an interval where b∗G(θ) > 0 and m > θL.
The proof of this appears in Section A.4.2 of the Appendix. Below, we explain intuitively the
meaning behind the four cases with figures. These illustrations probably provide more insight
then the proofs in the Appendix.
Case 1 of Proposition 4 corresponds to the case of the government having the inherent advantage
and the insurgents being very weak (small VI). Even if the government implements no initial
bribe, the insurgents cannot mount an effective counter-bribe. By Proposition 1 the insurgents
would counter-bribe the individuals in [θL, θN ], but by assumption the cost to do this is more
than the insurgents are willing to spend. Figure 3.2 illustrates this case. We denote the area
under the curve as A in Figure 3.2 and we give similar labels in the figures throughout this
section. It is important to keep in mind that these areas are computed with respect to the density
w(θ) so for example area A =
∫ θN
θL
v(θ)w(θ)dθ in Figure 3.2. This figure is similar to Figure 2
in GS.

























Figure 3.2: Case 1 of Proposition 4, area A > VI . Total cost of government bribe equals 0
In Case 2 of Proposition 4, VI is large enough such that the insurgents will overcome their
initial preference disadvantage if the government does not make a bribe offer to the population.
However, the government can achieve victory by bribing the individuals for θ ∈ [θL, θN ], a
modest amount. If the insurgents make a winning counter-bribe, by Proposition 1 the insurgents
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would counter-bribe the individuals in [θL, θN ]. Thus, the government needs to make the cost
of this counter-bribe VI to ensure victory. Figure 3.3 illustrates this case when the government
executes a leveling bribe. This figure has similarities to Figure 3 in GS, but has some subtle
differences.




















Figure 3.3: Case 2 of Proposition 4, area A < VI . The government spends an amount B on
bribes such that A+B = VI
In Figure 3.3, the area A under the curve satisfies A < VI by assumption. Thus, the government
needs to implement a bribe that adds an area B inside the red rectangle in Figure 3.3 such that
A + B = VI . The bribe in Figure 3.3 accomplishes this, however, any bribe that adds mass
B to within the red rectangle will be an equivalent bribe. It would not be an optimal bribe for
the government to implement a bribe bG(θ) such that v(θ) + bG(θ) > v(θL), because then by
Proposition 1 the insurgents would counter-bribe individuals for θ < θL and the government
could reduce their bribe.
One of the observations in GS is that for case 2 of Proposition 4, the government only bribes
pro-government individuals. This follows from the strategic nature of the interaction. The
government cannot be content that it has an initial advantage; it needs to fortify its coalition to
ensure the insurgents cannot make a successful counter-bribe. From a societal point of view, this
is beneficial because the population gains benefits B (in Figure 3.3), even though the amount
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of intelligence the government receives would be the same if bribes were not allowed by either
side. As discussed in Section 3.1, the “bribes” could actually be societal benefits such as pub-
lic goods, and therefore the conflict between government and insurgents produces additional
benefits to society. In this case, the government would provide additional benefits even though
the insurgents themselves would not. The possibility of the insurgents making a compelling
counter-bribe is sufficient to cause the government to increase the benefits it provides to the so-
ciety. This insight is consistent with Burgoon [57] who argues that terrorist groups can provide
social welfare to marginalized groups in society in exchange for their support. When this oc-
curs, the government must increase the provision of social benefits to these groups to decrease
the incentives to support the terrorists.
In case 3 of Proposition 4, the government still has the initial preference advantage, but the
insurgents are strong enough so that the government needs to bribe some of the pro-insurgent
individuals to win. Case 4 of Proposition 4 is nearly identical to case 3 (at least in terms of the
government’s response), but in this case the government initially is at a preference disadvantage.
In both cases by Proposition 3 a leveling strategy is optimal. We illustrate case 4 in Figure 3.4.
A figure illustrating case 3 would be identical to Figure 3.4, except the location of θL would
be before θN and thus we omit it. The government needs to spend an amount D shown in
figure Figure 3.4 to overcome the pro-insurgent preferences and then must spend an additional
amount of B + C to ensure the insurgents cannot offer a winning counter-bribe. Note that
C = VI , so the government must spend a considerable amount more than the insurgents are
willing to spend to achieve victory. Thus, the government needs to be much stronger than the
insurgents to win. From a counterinsurgency perspective, case 4 of Proposition 4 is the most
realistic and interesting, because the insurgents have the initial advantage.
Lowest Cost Government Bribe
The first two cases of Proposition 4 uniquely determine the government’s optimal winning lev-
eling bribe. However, cases 3 and 4 of Proposition 4 specify the leveling bribe in terms of a
parameter m. In this section, we assume we are in case 3 or 4 of Proposition 4 and examine the
optimal m∗ that yields the lowest cost victory for the government. As before, we assume VG is
large enough that the government will win. First, let us define the height of the leveling bribe





















Figure 3.4: Case 4 of Proposition 4. The government spends an amount B + C + D on bribes
such that C = VI
By construction, H(m) corresponds to the optimal bribe by the following relationship H(m) =
v(θ) + b∗G(θ) for all θ that receive a bribe from the government. By inspection, H(m) is a
decreasing function of m. If the government chooses a larger m then they will bribe more
individuals, however the per capita bribe H(m) will decrease. Thus, the total cost to execute
the government’s bribe may increase or decrease with m.
As in GS, we will distinguish between two types of bribes: one in which the government bribes
all of the individuals who provide intelligence, and one in which the government only bribes a
fraction of these individuals.
Definition 6. Flooded coalition. A coalition in which the government bribes all of its support-
ers. Formally the government supporting coalition is flooded if H(m) > v(−1
2
).
Definition 7. Nonflooded coalition. A coalition in which the government bribes only a fraction




Definition 8. Universal coalition. All of the population supports the government. Formally
m = 1
2
and thus SG(m) = 1.
Figure 3.5 illustrates a flooded and nonflooded coalition. We have labeled the figures in the
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same manner as Figure 3.4, although we have replaced C with VI to emphasize that relation-
ship. These figures are similar to Figures 4–5 in GS. We distinguish between these two types









































Figure 3.5: Nonflooded and Flooded Coalitions. The total cost of the government’s bribe =
B +D + VI
of winning coalitions because the mathematics to analyze the two situations is slightly differ-
ent. In a nonflooded coalition, a set of the most pro-government individuals do not require a
government bribe because their preferences so strongly favor the government that the cost to
offer them a counter-bribe is too high for the insurgents even in the absence of a bribe from the
government. In a flooded coalition, the value of VI is large enough so that everyone in [−12 ,m]
requires a bribe from the government. We can now compute the total cost for the government










(H(m)− v(θ))w(θ)dθ if H(m) ≤ v(−1
2
) (3.7b)
The following proposition specifies the value m∗ that minimizes the cost function TG(m) de-
fined in (3.7a) and (3.7b). This corresponds to Proposition 2 in GS. As with Proposition 4, we
provide a geometric interpretation of the relationships in Proposition 5 below
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Proposition 5. If the government wins under Case 3 or 4 of Proposition 4, the optimal value of
m∗ is unique and is one of the following








L−W (v−1 (H(m∗)))) = −v(m∗)(SG(m∗)− L)






H(m∗)L = −v(m∗)(SG(m∗)− L)
3. The government constructs the universalistic coalition in which case m∗ = 1
2
.
The proof of this appears in Section A.4.3 of the Appendix. In the Appendix, we show there
can be at most one solution to the root equations in case 1 and 2 of Proposition 5. Below
we present figures that illustrate the conditions m∗ must satisfy. If the winning coalition is not
universal, then the bribe parameterm∗ is chosen such that the area of rectangleA equals the area
of rectangle B in Figure 3.6. As stated above the area is computed with respect to the density
w(θ). Let us consider case 2 of Proposition 5, which corresponds to the flooded condition. The
left-hand side of the equation in case 2 (H(m∗)L) is the area of A in Figure 3.6b and the right-
hand side ( −v(m∗)(SG(m∗) − L)) is the area of B in Figure 3.6b. As m increases the area of
A will decrease and the area of B will increase, so there is only one unique m∗ where the two
areas will coincide. Figure 3.6 is similar to Figures 6–7 in GS.
Once we compute the value of m∗ as specified in Proposition 5, then we can substitute m∗ into
(3.7a) or (3.7b) to compute the cost for the government to win if they execute the lowest cost
bribe defined by m∗. If TG(m∗) ≤ VG then the government should implement the bribe and
achieve the victory. Otherwise the government should make no bribe and concede. This is
summarized in Section 3.2.4.
3.2.4 Complete Equilibrium
Putting together the analyses in Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3, we can specify the equilibria of the
game that will occur under different scenarios. In this section, we consider the value constraints
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Figure 3.6: Illustration of Proposition 5. At the optimum, A=B
VI and VG, which we ignored for most of Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3. The structure of these
outcomes closely mirror those of Proposition 4
1. If θL < θN and VI ≤
∫ θN
θL
v(θ)w(θ)dθ, then b∗G(θ) = 0, b
∗
I(θ) = 0 and the government
wins.
2. If θL < θN and
∫ θN
θL
v(θ)w(θ)dθ ≤ VI ≤ v(θL)
∫ θN
θL




max(a, v(θ))w(θ)dθ = VI . One of two alternatives will occur
(a) If
∫ θN




v−1(a)(a− v(θ))w(θ)dθ < VG, the government makes the leveling bribe b∗G(θ) =
a − v(θ) for θ ∈ [v−1(a), θN ] and b∗G(θ) = 0 for θ /∈ [v−1(a), θN ] and b∗I(θ) = 0.
The government wins.
3. If θL < θN and VI > v(θL)
∫ θN
θL
w(θ)dθ then there is some leveling strategy bG(θ) such
that bG(θ) = H(m∗) − v(θ) on an interval where bG(θ) > 0 and m∗ is defined by the




] : bG(θ) > 0}. One of










(H(m∗) − v(θ))w(θ)dθ < VG, the government makes the leveling bribe
b∗G(θ) = H(m
∗)−v(θ) for θ ∈ [θ,m∗] and b∗G(θ) = 0 for θ /∈ [θ,m∗] and b∗I(θ) = 0.
The government wins.
4. If θL > θN then there is some leveling strategy bG(θ) such that bG(θ) = H(m∗)−v(θ) on
an interval where b∗G(θ) > 0 and m
∗ is is defined by the lowest cost bribe in Proposition













(H(m∗) − v(θ))w(θ)dθ < VG, the government makes the leveling bribe
b∗G(θ) = H(m
∗)−v(θ) for θ ∈ [θ,m∗] and b∗G(θ) = 0 for θ /∈ [θ,m∗] and b∗I(θ) = 0.
The government wins.
In Chapter 4, we perform several numerical experiments to illustrate when each of these 7
outcome occurs, and how the results depend upon the various parameters.
3.2.5 Analysis
While we perform most of the analysis in Chapter 4, there are some analytic relationships we
examine. Some of these results correspond to results in GS, whereas others are new contribu-
tions. In this section we assume that VG is large enough so that the government will win. The
next proposition describes the level of support that the government will receive if it wins.
Proposition 6. If the government wins it must win with excess support. That is SG(m∗) > L.
The proof of this appears in Section A.4.4 of the Appendix. We only need to focus on case 4 of
Proposition 4 when considering Proposition 6, because in cases 1–3 of Proposition 4 we have
by assumption θL < θN , and thus SG(m∗) > L. Within a game-theoretic framework the result
of Proposition 6 is fairly intuitive. If SG(m∗) = L, then the insurgents can make a winning
counter-bribe at negligible cost. In GS, the analog of Proposition 6 is the major result. In many
legislative scenarios, a measure passes with a large fraction of the votes. When examining the
problem from a decision analytic framework, this seems suboptimal, because it would be less
costly to win with the bare majority. GS’s major contribution is that examining voting within
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a vote buying context as a decision analytic process (as opposed to game theoretic) is flawed.
This result is also useful from a counterinsurgency perspective. If the government (or coalition
forces) need some base level of support or intelligence to effectively combat the insurgents, then
they must realize that to accomplish this they will need to actually generate more than this base
level. If the government only have the resources or tactics necessary to generate a level L of
support, than the they will lose.
We next examine how the support level SG(m∗) varies with the other parameters of the model.
The next Proposition describes those relationships
Proposition 7. The level of support SG(m∗) the government receives for an optimal bribe has
the following properties.
1. SG(m∗) is nondecreasing in VI .
2. SG(m∗) is nondecreasing in L.
3. SG(m∗) is nondecreasing if the population’s preferences shift from v1(θ) to v2(θ) and
|v2(θ)| ≤ |v1(θ)|.
4. SG(m∗) is nondecreasing if the population’s weight shifts fromW1(θ) toW2(θ),W2(θ) ≥
W1(θ) for all θ ∈ [−12 , 12 ] and the government’s optimal bribe always produces a flooded
coalition.
The proof of this appears in Section A.4.5 of the Appendix. Case 1 of Proposition 7 is noted by
GS and states that the stronger the insurgents are, the more support the government will receive
if it wins. GS claims this is a counterintuitive result, but it should not be when viewing the in-
teraction from a strategic standpoint. If the insurgents are strong, the only way the government
can hope to win is if they can convince most of the population to support them, because this in-
creases the cost of a winning insurgent counter-bribe. Cases 2-4 do not appear in GS. Case 2 of
Proposition 7 is intuitive: if the government requires more support to achieve victory, then they
amount that they actually receive will increase. Case 3 of Proposition 7 states that if the pop-
ulation’s preferences are less extreme (i.e., pro-government individuals prefer the government
less and pro-insurgent individual prefer the insurgents less), the level of support the government
will generate increases. This follows for two reasons. If the pro-government individuals prefer
the government less, then to implement the original bribe to those pro-government individu-
als would cost the government more. To decrease the cost, the government would lower the
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level of the bribe, but in order to still achieve victory they would also have to increase m∗ as
a result (see equation 3.6). Furthermore, in this situation the bribes to convince pro-insurgent
individuals to provide intelligence decreases, and thus the government can increase the number
of those individuals that support the government. Finally, case 4 of Proposition 7 states that if
the population’s weight shifts so that a larger fraction of the population is pro-government, then
the government will receive more support if it wins. This is intuitive, because the population’s
attitudes have shifted toward the government so it costs less to gain more supporters.
3.3 Coercion
In this section, we propose a modification to the initial model to incorporate insurgent coercion.
We can view coercion as being an implicit component of the base model in Section 3.2 by mod-
eling the preference function v(θ) as accounting for the possible coercion that individuals may
receive for providing intelligence to the government. However, in that framework, coercion is a
passive parameter. In this section, we model coercion as an active parameter that the insurgents
control.
We first describe the formulation in Section 3.3.1 and then perform additional analysis for the
situation when the government obtains a flooded coalition (see Definition 6 in Section 3.3.2).
3.3.1 General Case
The base model of base model in Section 3.2 is a two period sequential game where the govern-
ment makes an initial bribe to the government and then the insurgents make a counter-bribe. In
this section, we assume there is a three period game: the insurgents move first and choose some
coercion level α ∈ [0, 1], then the government observes this coercion level and they make their
bribe, followed by the insurgents’ counter-bribe in the final period. We incorporate coercion
into the model in this fashion partly because of convenience to fit within our framework, but
we also feel it is a realistic assumption for the coercion level to be set at the start. We assume
that the insurgents have the upper hand in the area and thus have made the population aware
of the potential repercussions for helping the government. Also in terms of their interactions
with the populations, the insurgents have established some atmosphere of violence, fear, and
intimidation. Therefore, we assume the insurgents commit to a level of coercion at the begin-
ning of the game. There are other ways to incorporate coercion into the model (e.g., having
the insurgents choose the coercion level after the governments offer the initial bribe) and we
discuss the shortcomings of our coercion model further in Chapter 5. We further assume that
coercion is a no cost endeavor for the insurgents. This may be reasonable if, for example, the
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insurgents can create a level of fear in the population via a handful of thugs patrolling a village
with weapons. The actual cost may be low compared with paying individuals or providing ben-
efits via the counter-bribes. Even if this is not a good assumption, it does provide a best-case
scenario for the insurgents with respect to coercion. We could include a cost to coercion, but
it would be an additional parameter to the model and we feel it does contribute much to the
analysis. The purpose is examine the optimal level of coercion from the insurgents’ point of
view. Even in this relatively best case for the insurgents, the optimal level of coercion is often
not the maximum amount the insurgents could inflict.
We incorporate coercion by changing the preference function v(θ) of the population. The most
general modification would be to define the preference function v(θ, α) to be an arbitrary func-




≤ 0 if θ < θN (3.8a)
∂v(θ, α)
∂α
≥ 0 if θ ≥ θN (3.8b)
The conditions in (3.8) imply that as coercion increases the pro-government individuals prefer
the government less and the pro-insurgent individuals prefer the insurgents less. As with other
aspects of the model, part of the motivation of (3.8a)–(3.8b) is analytic convenience. However,
we want to have a mechanism that accounts for coercion impacting the entire population, not
necessarily just the pro-government individuals. Equation (3.8) implies that the intensity of
preferences decreases for all individuals. The logic behind (3.8a) is that coercion effectively
reduces the preferences of the pro-government individuals, because they fear violent reprisals
from the insurgents. Thus the government may need to offer a larger bribe to these individuals
to compensate them for the coercion they may receive as a result of supporting the government.
Relationship (3.8b) states that the preference for the insurgents of pro-insurgent individuals
also decreases as a result of the coercion. This may occur for several reasons. The insurgents
presumably only want to coerce those providing intelligence to the government, but they may
mistakenly coerce those who have pro-insurgent preferences. Furthermore, coercion creates an
atmosphere of fear and violence and even if individuals do not like the government, their affinity
for the insurgents may decrease as a result of living in a violent environment. To conclude, we
want to incorporate coercion in such a way that it can negatively impact the pro-insurgent indi-
viduals (see Anbar Awakening [58]) and we feel that conditions (3.8a)–(3.8b) are a reasonable
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first attempt to do that.
It is difficult to perform much analysis for an arbitrary function v(θ, α) that satisfies (3.8),
therefore to facilitate further analysis we examine a separable v(θ, α) function:
v(θ, α) =
{
qG(α)v(θ) if θ < θN (3.9a)
qI(α)v(θ) if θ ≥ θN (3.9b)
For some 0 ≤ qG(α) ≤ qI(α) ≤ 1 and q′G(α), q′I(α) ≤ 0. The form in (3.9a)–(3.9b) implies that
the relative impact of coercion on pro-government (or pro-insurgent) individuals is the same.
We assume that qG(α) ≤ qI(α) so that coercion has a greater impact on the pro-government in-
dividuals than the pro-insurgent individuals. The insurgents should exert most of their coercion
on pro-government individuals so the coercion should have a greater impact on them.
Once the insurgents choose the coercion parameter α, the preference function is determined by
(3.9a)–(3.9b), and then the game proceeds as defined by the base model in Section 3.2. The
equilibrium of the game will be the same as defined in Section 3.2.4, with v(θ) replaced by
v(θ, α) in (3.9a)–(3.9b). We will now examine the optimal level of coercion, α∗. Coercion may
or may not affect the outcome of the game, and thus there may be multiple equilibria corre-
sponding to many values of α∗. Rather than discussing those uninteresting cases, we will focus
on the insurgents choosing α∗ to maximize the the cost of the government’s winning bribe. If
this α∗ increases the government’s cost enough to change the equilibrium from government vic-
tory to insurgent victory (from case 3b or 4b to 3a or 4a in Section 3.2.4), there may be multiple
levels of coercion that achieve this victory for the insurgents. Similarly, if the government’s cost
produced by α∗ still allows government victory, than it doesn’t matter what coercion level the
insurgents choose (the government wins regardless). Thus the key component in the analysis is
computing α∗ that maximizes the government’s initial bribe to achieve victory. That is what we
will focus on here.
Our first two results do not examine α∗, but look at the specific cases when the government or
insurgents will always lose because of coercion. Proposition 8 states that if the insurgents co-
ercive powers are brutal enough and the government is weak, the government cannot overcome
the fear in the population to achieve victory.
Proposition 8. If qG(1) = 0 and VI1−L > VG the government cannot win.
The proof of this appears in Section A.5.1 of the Appendix. The condition qG(1) = 0 in
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Proposition 8 implies that the insurgents can break the will of the pro-government population
with enough coercion (potentially at the risk of alienating the pro-insurgent population). The
government can still win with a large enough bribe, but if VI
1−L > VG, they do not value the
victory enough to offer a bribe. If the insurgents are strong and capable of very brutal coercion
and the government is relatively weak, then the government cannot win. While Proposition 8
assumes the government is in a position of relative weakness, the next proposition assumes the
insurgents are in the weak position, which corresponds to cases 1 and 2 of the equilibria defined
in Section 3.2.4:
Proposition 9. If θL < θN and VI ≤ v(θL)
∫ θN
θL
w(θ)dθ and VG is such that case 2(b) holds for
the equilibria defined in Section 3.2.4 then one of the following holds.
1. If VI ≤ qG(1)v(θL)
∫ θN
θL
w(θ)dθ the insurgents cannot win for any level of coercion.
2. If VI > qG(1)v(θL)
∫ θN
θL





v(θL)(W (θN)− L) ≥ qG(α)
}
The main condition of Proposition 9 corresponds to being in case 1 or 2 of the equilibria defined
in Section 3.2.4. Case 1 of Proposition 9 implies that case 1 or 2(b) of the equilibria defined in
Section 3.2.4 will still occur even if the insurgents maximize their coercion. This corresponds to
a strong government and a weak insurgency. The insurgents are so weak that their coercion has
a negligible impact on the population’s preferences. One could argue that in this case the insur-
gents are so weak that they could be categorized as a nuisance more than an insurgency. Case
2 of Proposition 9 implies that the insurgents have enough coercive capabilities that they push
the situation from case 1 or 2(b) to case 3 of the equilibria defined in Section 3.2.4. The optimal
level α∗ is nontrivial (i.e., greater than 0). Even though the insurgents are relatively weak, they
effectively use coercion to put themselves on a more level footing with the government. This
is similar to the insights in [37] where weak candidates in elections resort to violence. In the
model of [37], the supporters of rival political parties split into two main categories: hardcore
and soft base supporters. Coercion causes soft base supporters to withhold support for their
party, while hardcore supporters will continue to provide support. While accounting for coer-
cion in a different manner than in our model, they do derive a similar result that coercion is
effective for weaker parties. Note that Proposition 9 does not imply the insurgents will win, but
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it implies that the scenario will correspond to case 3 instead of case 2 in Section 3.2.4, which is
more favorable to the insurgents.
We now focus on the specific value of α∗ that will maximize the cost for the government to
achieve victory. We first rewrite several of the terms from Section 3.2.3 in terms of α. We define
m(α) to be the optimalm defined by Proposition 5, which now depends upon the coercion level
α. The next proposition states how m(α) varies with α.
Proposition 10. The government bribe parameter m(α) is a nondecreasing function of α
This is just a direct application of case 3 of Proposition 7 in Section 3.2.5 and Lemma 4 of
Section A.4.5 in the Appendix. Because the government’s winning level of support SG(m) =
W (m) is a nondecreaesing function, the following corollary follows immediately from Propo-
sition 10
Corollary 1. The government’s winning support level is a nondecreasing function of α
Corollary 1 implies that in the face of coercion the government will receive more support and
intelligence (if they win of course). This follows for two reasons that can be seen in Figure
3.7. First, with increased coercion it costs the government more to bribe the pro-government
individuals (area A), and thus they want to decrease the height of the leveling bribe and pay less
(area C). But by definition of this height H(m) in equation (3.6), the government must bribe
more individuals if the height decreases (area D). Secondly, and more importantly, coercion
decreases the cost for the government to bribe the pro-insurgent population (area B), thus the
government can successfully bribe more of them when the insurgents increase coercion. This
concept is consistent with the outcome of the Anbar Awakening [58]. The coercion by the
insurgents was brutal, which led to eventually nearly full support for the government when the
population turned on the insurgents.




Finally we write the cost to the government in terms of α. Recall the cost function has two cases
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Figure 3.7: Coercion’s impact on the government’s bribe







































We can examine how the cost changes with α by referring to Figure 3.7. The cost will decrease
an amount of C +B, but the cost of the bribe will increase an amount A+D, and it is not clear
from the figure which of those effects will dominate. This suggests that coercion may or may
not be an effective tool for the insurgents. We can more rigorously analyze the behavior of the
















) v(θ)w(θ)dθ − q′I(α)
∫ m(α)
θN
v(θ)w(θ)dθ if H(α)qG(α) ≤ v(− 12 )(3.12b)
Going from equations (3.11a)–(3.11b) to (3.12a)–(3.12b) is not trivial and the calculations
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appear in Section A.5.2 in the Appendix. Without further assumptions, it is difficult to make
concrete comments on the value of α∗. However, we can produce some qualitative insights by
examining equations (3.12a)–(3.12b). The derivative T ′G(α) is made up of two terms: a positive
term (the first integral) and a negative term (the second integral). Furthermore, these two terms
have a nice interpretation. The first term represents the overall intensity of preferences from
the pro-government individuals, and the second term represents the intensity of preferences
from the pro-insurgent individuals that the government successfully bribes. The insurgents
want the derivative positive to increase the cost for the government so they want the first term
to dominate. This will occur when the pro-government population has strong preferences for
the government and the pro-insurgent individuals have mild preferences for the insurgents. In
this case, coercion will be effective. However, if the situation is reversed and the pro-insurgent
population has strong preference intensity for the insurgents (so the second term in (3.12a)–
(3.12b) dominates), than coercion can backfire. In this case, the coercion significantly alienates
the pro-insurgent faction of the population and it may be easier for the government to bribe
these individuals and obtain enough support from the population to win. Therefore, equations
(3.12a)–(3.12b) illustrate the fragile nature of coercion and that arbitrarily increasing coercion
may not be the right choice for the insurgents and may actually lead to victory by the govern-
ment.
In the next subsection, we make more specific assumptions to examine the effects of coercion.
3.3.2 Flooded Coalition
In this section, we limit the analysis to the case of flooded coalitions to show further results.
In this case we only need to consider equations (3.11a) and (3.12a). We make this assumption
partly because those two equations are more analytically tractable than the nonflooded counter-
parts, but also because flooded coalitions correspond to a strong insurgency. The government




(1− L). We next make a
further assumption on the coercion functions qG(α) and qI(α):
qI(α) = p+ (1− p)qG(α) (3.13)
The parameter p can take on two potential interpretations. In one, p is a measure of the insur-
gents’ situational awareness in distinguishing between pro-government or pro-insurgent indi-
viduals when executing coercion. The higher p, the less collateral damage the insurgents cause.
Another interpretation of p is the willingness of the pro-insurgent population to live and ac-
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cept an environment of fear and violence. As with many assumptions in the model, part of the
motivation is analytic tractability, but we also wanted to examine the effect of the situational
awareness (or population resilience) parameter p on the model. The next Proposition states the
obvious relationship that insurgents prefer a larger value of p.
Proposition 11. TG(α) increases in p for any α.
The proof of this appears in Section A.5.3 of the Appendix. We next substitute equation (3.13)
into equation (3.12a) to examine the derivate of the government’s cost.










We can now make specific statements about the optimal coercion level α∗. The next proposition
states that there are only three options for α∗
Proposition 12. The optimal α∗ either corresponds to a unique interior point maximizer that is
the root of equation (3.14) or it is an endpoint: α∗ ∈ {0, 1}.
The proof of this appears in Section A.5.4 of the Appendix. The interesting result of Propo-
sition 12 is that in some cases α∗ < 1. This is useful from a policy standpoint because the
insurgents may push too far with their coercion alienating the population and this may allow
the government to effectively bribe the population and win. For lower levels of coercion, it may
have been too costly for the government to win. We conclude this subsection by analyzing how
α∗ varies with some of the other parameters of the model. The following proposition is similar
to Proposition 7 in Section 3.2.5
Proposition 13. The optimal level of coercion α∗ has the following properties.
1. α∗ is nonincreasing in VI .
2. α∗ is nonincreasing in L.
3. α∗ is nondecreasing in p.
The proof of this appears in Section A.5.5 of the Appendix. Case 1 of Proposition 13 states that
the stronger the insurgents are the less they need coercion. This is consistent with Proposition
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9, which stated coercion was an effective tool for weak insurgents. Coercion has negative
consequences for the insurgents, and so if the insurgents are strong enough they need not resort
to it (or can afford to execute lower amounts of it). Case 2 of Proposition 13 states that the more
intelligence the government needs to win, the less the insurgents should coerce. In this case the
government needs a larger coalition to achieve victory and so will need to bribe more of the
pro-insurgent individuals to do this. Increasing coercion would only alienate these individuals
and make it easier for the government to win. Finally, case 3 of Proposition 13 states an intuitive
result. The higher the situational awareness of the insurgents, the more they insurgents should
coerce. There are fewer negative consequences of coercion, so the insurgents should execute
more of it.
3.4 Discrete Population
In some contexts, individuals belong to a social structure (e.g., tribe, clan), and essentially
pledge to follow the will of the group’s leader. Even if the population is large, if there are only
a limited number of these tribes , assuming that the population is a continuum may be a poor
assumption. In this section, we examine a discrete population where the population consists
of a finite number of tribes. Tribe i has preference vi and weight wi. The weight may, for
example, be a function of the number of individuals in the tribe. We can view these situations
as the government and insurgents dealing directly with a limited number of tribal leaders. In this
setting, we can analyze which tribes the government and insurgents should target for support.
We assume there are N tribes and that the cost to cause a tribe to switch from its natural pref-
erence is |viwi| and that the transaction is all or nothing. A fraction of a tribe cannot be suc-
cessfully bribed. As stated above we can view the negotiations as taking place solely with the
tribal leaders. There are several articles that examine the GS setting for discrete population, and
those results and analyses are similar to the original GS work [29, 30]. However, all of these
works assume that the tribes have the same weight, which is not the case in our setting. The dis-
crete case with arbitrary weights is much more difficult to analyze than the continuous model,
because the greedy approach used in the continuous model no longer holds. The analysis of
the model introduced in Section 3.2 relies on Proposition 1: the insurgents will counter-bribe
all of the lowest cost individuals until they have eroded the government’s support sufficiently.
This greedy approach only applies to a discrete population in the limit as the number of tribes
increases and the weight of any one tribe goes to zero. For a large number of tribes, the greedy
approach should be close to the optimal solution. We illustrate why the greedy approach does
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not apply in the discrete case via a counterexample in the next subsection, when we discuss
the insurgents’ optimal strategy. Then in Section 3.4.2, we examine the government’s optimal
bribe. The analysis in this section is somewhat limited and there is opportunity for future work
to derive more significant results.
3.4.1 Insurgent Strategy
Just as in the continuous case, we first examine the insurgents counter-bribe. We assume the




I(vi + bG(i) > 0)wi (3.15)
As in the continuous, case we initially ignore the constraint VI and assume the insurgents will
always make a winning counter-bribe. The insurgents will choose the lowest cost bribe bI(i),
such that the government has less than L support from the population. That is, the insurgents








I(vi + bG(i) > bI(i))wi ≤ L (3.16b)
bI(i) ≥ 0 (3.16c)
We can reformulate the optimization problem in equation(3.16) as a knapsack type problem.
To do this, we define xi to be an indicator variable that is 1 if the tribe will not support the
government. The insurgents choose the xi such that the government has less than L support
(i.e.,
∑N
i=1wi(1− xi) < L), and the insurgents want to do this at the lowest cost possible. The
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wi(1− xi) ≤ L (3.17b)
bI(i) ≥ (vi + bG(i))xi (3.17c)
bI(i) ≥ 0 (3.17d)
xi ∈ {0, 1} (3.17e)
The optimization problem in (3.17) has a nonlinear objective function, however we know that
for the optimal solution bI(i) = 0 or bI(i) = vi + bG(i), and thus we can make some modifica-
tions so that the the optimization problem is a knapsack variant. Details of this modification and
a dynamic programming algorithm to solve for the low cost insurgent counter-bribe are given
in Section A.6.1 of the Appendix. The main take away is that these quantities can be solved in
a straightforward manner.
Once the insurgents solve the optimization problem in (3.17), they know how much it costs to
win. If this costs less then VI , the optimal strategy for the insurgents is to execute the solution
(3.17) as the winning counter-bribe. Otherwise, if the cost is larger than VI the insurgents
concede victory to the government without making a counter-bribe. Now that we have specified
how the insurgents would calculate their lowest cost counter-bribe and whether they would
execute this counter-bribe, we will give an example where the lowest cost counter-bribe for the
insurgents does not consist of greedily bribing the lowest cost tribes. Thus, a discrete version
of Proposition 1 does not exist. However, inspection of (3.17) does lead to an analog version of
Proposition 1 if the weights are uniform (i.e., wi = 1N ). In that case, constraint 3.17b determines
how many tribes to counter-bribe, and the objective function in (3.17a) and constraint(3.17c)
specifies that the cheapest of those tribes should be counter-bribed an amount vi + bG(i). This
case was analyzed in [29, 30].
Let us now proceed with the counterexample. Assume that the government does not offer an
initial bribe, bG(i) = 0 for all i, and the tribes have the characteristics listed in Table 3.2.
Furthermore let us set L = 0.4, and thus the insurgents must successfully counter-bribe SG −










Table 3.2: Tribe characteristics
to convince tribe 2 to not support the government. This reduces the support to the government
to 0.39, and thus the insurgents win. The optimal counter-bribe does not involve the tribe with
the weakest preference for the government (tribe 4, v4 = 1.1), nor does it involve the tribe
with the smallest weight (tribe 1, w1 = 0.04), nor does it involve the tribe that was the lowest
cost to counter-bribe (tribe 3: w3v3 = 0.065). As with the classic knapsack problem, a greedy
approach will not produce the optimal bribe for the insurgents.
3.4.2 Government Strategy
We initially assume that VG is large enough for the government to win. The government knows
the insurgents determine their low cost counter-bribe according to the optimization problem
in (3.17). If we define the value of that low cost counter-bribe as an explicit function of the






CI(bG(·)) ≥ VI (3.18b)
bG(i) ≥ 0 (3.18c)
Unfortunately, the constraint in (3.18b) involves the output of an integer program (see Section
A.6.1 in the Appendix) in (3.17) and thus is not trivial. In Section A.6.2 of the Appendix,
we discuss how to formulate (3.18) as minimax optimization program. In the Appendix we
conjecture that the transformed optimization problem can be solved using variant of Bender’s
decomposition [59]. In this case, the government’s optimal bribe can be calculated numerically
using most standard solvers if N is not too large. We illustrate the discrete model in Chapter
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4 with numerical examples. However, deriving any analytic insight from the specific form of
the optimization problem appears difficult. Thus, we conclude that the discrete population with




In this chapter, we present the results of numerical experiments that examine several potential
counterinsurgency contexts. The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the results from Chapter
4 and emphasize the practical implications of those results. In Section 4.1, we describe the
specific parameters we will use in this section. In Section 4.2, we examine the base case model
corresponding to Section 3.2. We next illustrate the effect of coercion in Section 4.3. Finally,
we analyze the discrete model from Section 3.4 via numerical examples in Section 4.4.
4.1 Parameters
The base model requires five input parameters to fully characterize the game between the gov-
ernment and the insurgents. We list these below, but a more full discussion of these parameters
appears in Section 3.2.1
1. VI : the strength of the insurgents
2. VG: the strength of the government
3. v(θ): population preference function
4. w(θ): population weight function
5. L: support required for government victory.
Each combination of the input parameters corresponds to a specific context that will produce
different strategies and outcomes in the game. For many of the figures in this chapter, we will
vary VI over some range. For the support required for government victory, we will primarily
analyze one of the following four values
1. L = 0.1: the government needs a minimal amount of support to win
2. L = 0.4: the government needs to receive intelligence from slightly less than half the
population to win
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3. L = 0.6: the government needs to receive intelligence from slightly more than half the
population to win
4. L = 0.9: the government needs support from nearly the entire population to win
We next list the preference functions and weight functions we will use in Sections 4.1.1 and
4.1.2, respectively. We conclude with a brief summary of the parameter values in Section 4.1.3.
4.1.1 Preference Function
We examine three different population preference functions. We define them as v1(θ), v2(θ),
and v3(θ) so we can use this notation later in the Chapter when referring to these various pref-
erence functions. The mathematical definitions are given below, followed by their graphical
representation in Figure 4.1.
1. v1(θ) = −2θ (symmetric preference)
2. v2(θ) = −0.543eθ+1 + 1.8953 (pro-government population)
3. v3(θ) = −2.4663 log(θ + 1)− 0.7095 (pro-insurgent population)
While the form of these three preference functions may appear odd, there is some logic to them.












= 1 and that each one corresponds to
either pro-government, neutral, or pro-insurgent preferences. Technically, the full preference of
the population also requires the weighting function, but each preference function has a different
value of θN . For v1(θ) the neutral individual corresponds to θN = 0, and the value is θN = 0.25
and θN = −0.25 for v2(θ) and v3(θ), respectively.
4.1.2 Weight Function
We examine 5 different weight functions and define them as w1(θ), w2(θ), w3(θ), w4(θ), and
w5(θ). We list the description of each weight function and present the densities in Figure 4.2.
1. w1(θ) : uniform
2. w2(θ) : triangular distribution with mode at θ = 0. In this case, most of the population






































Figure 4.1: Population preference functions
3. w3(θ) : inverted triangular distribution with min at θ = 0. In this case, the population has
a bimodal distribution with two factions that have fairly extreme preferences.
4. w4(θ) : triangular distribution with mode at θ = −12 . In this case, the population is
heavily weighted toward the individuals with larger preferences for the government.
5. w5(θ) : triangular distribution with mode at θ = 12 . In this case the population is heavily
weighted toward the individuals with larger preferences for the insurgents.
While the weight function has to be combined with the preference function from Section 4.1.1
to determine the initial distribution of pro-government and pro-insurgent individuals, having
different weighting functions allows us to examine different scenarios.
4.1.3 Summary
The purpose of this chapter is not to inundate the reader with 60 figures corresponding to the
combinations of the preference function, the weight function, and the support required for gov-
ernment victory. We want to illustrate the model and its insights. Often times the results are
fairly invariant to the specific combination and when they are not, we will highlight why that oc-
curs. Having several different options for the parameters allows us to analyze several scenarios.
Three examples appear below
1. Neutral scenario. Preference function = v1(θ), weight function = w1(θ). In this situation,













































































Figure 4.2: Population weight functions
2. Government advantage scenario. Preference function = v2(θ), weight function = w4(θ).
In this situation, 93.75 percent of the population is pro-government.
3. Insurgent advantage. Preference function = v3(θ), weight function = w5(θ). In this situa-
tion, the 6.25 percent of the population is pro-government.
Obviously the government advantage scenario is not realistic in an insurgency context. The
neutral scenario will probably not be realistic in many situations either. However, it will be
interesting to compare how the relatively worst case (insurgent advantage scenario) differs from
the relatively best case scenario (government advantage scenario).
4.2 Base Model
For various parameters, we would like to know who will win and if the government wins how
much support it will receive. Determining who will win is equivalent to determining the min-
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imum cost for the government to achieve victory. If VG is less than this minimum cost, then
the insurgents win, otherwise the government wins. We will study the two issues of victory
(Section 4.2.1) and support (Section 4.2.2) in the following subsections and also illustrate the
relationships from Section 3.2.5.
4.2.1 Government Victory Threshold
In Section 3.2.4, the outcome of the game is fully specified based on the model parameters.
For parameters VI , L, v(·), w(·), we can define TG(VI , L, v(·), w(·)) to be the minimum cost
required for the government to achieve victory. This is the optimal value of TG(m) from equa-
tions (3.7a)–(3.7b). Computing TG(VI , L, v(·), w(·)) can be done via the analysis in Section
3.2.3 (specifically Proposition 5). In this section, we plot TG(VI , L, v(·), w(·)) as a func-
tion of VI for fixed L, v(·), w(·). The quantity TG(VI , L, v(·), w(·)) forms a threshold: if
TG(VI , L, v(·), w(·)) < VG the government wins, otherwise the insurgents win. By examin-
ing these plots, we see how much more difficult it will be for the government to win in certain
scenarios. We will refer to TG(VI , L, v(·), w(·)) as the government victory threshold in this
section.
We first examine how the government victory threshold varies with L in Figure 4.3. We only
consider the neutral scenario (Figure 4.3a), the government advantage scenario (Figure 4.3b),
and the insurgent advantage scenario (Figure 4.3c). These scenarios are described in Section
4.1.3. Obviously, the threshold increases with VI : the stronger the insurgents are, the more
the government will need to spend to successfully deter them from mounting a compelling
counter-bribe. For large VI , the curve describing the government victory threshold asymptotes
to a line with slope 1
1−L . This follows from equation (A.21a) in the Appendix and Lemma 4 of
the Appendix. For large enough VI , the government will eventually need a universal, flooded
coalition of support to win (see Definitions 6 and 8). In that case, the lowest cost bribe of the
government only depends upon VI via a VI1−L term. Proposition 7 states that the support for the
government increases with L as shown in Figure 4.3, which is intuitive. The more supporters
the government needs to procure the victory, the more it will need to spend. Furthermore, the
difference in scenarios can be significant. The government victory threshold is nearly zero in
the government advantage scenario (Figure 4.3b) for L = 0.1 for VI = 0.4. While this case is
beneficial for the government because they need limited support to achieve victory, the threshold
is much larger (nearly 0.7) for the insurgent advantage scenario. In some cases, the threshold
is 0 so the government can win without implementing a bribe (see Figure 4.3b for L = 0.1 and
small VI). This corresponds to case 1 of Section 3.2.4, where the insurgents are too weak to
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mount a compelling counter-bribe, even in the absence of a bribe by the government.
























(a) Neutral: v1(θ), w1(θ)
























(b) Gov. advantage: v2(θ), w4(θ)
























(c) Insurgent advantage: v3(θ), w5(θ)
Figure 4.3: Government victory threshold as a function of VI for several values of L
We next look at the case where we fix L = 0.4, and we plot the government victory threshold for
the three preferences functions v1(·), v2(·), v3(·). This appears in Figure 4.4. The combination
of the preferences and weighting function determine the populations predisposition to the gov-
ernment and insurgents. The more the population prefers the government, the less government
needs to pay for victory, which Figure 4.4 illustrates. Figures 4.4a–4.4c are similar, but there is
a clear difference between Figures 4.4d and 4.4e because those represent the extreme weighting
functions. This does illustrate the importance of considering the weighting function. Even if
the majority of the population has pro-government preferences (i.e., we have v2(·)), if the influ-
ential people in the population are the individuals with stronger preferences for the insurgents
(i.e., w5(·)), the government’s threshold will be significantly higher. To see this, compare, for
example, Figures 4.4a and 4.4e. Furtheremore, there is some subtle difference between Figure
4.4b and Figure 4.4c: the three curves are closer together in Figure 4.4c than in Figure 4.4b.
If the the preference advantage favors the insurgents (e.g., v3(·)), then it is better for the gov-
ernment to have a relatively polarized population (e.g., w3(·)) so that a larger fraction of the
population is initially pro-government. Thus, the threshold is lower for this case in Figure 4.4c,
then Figure 4.4b. However, if the government holds a preference advantage (e.g., v2(·)), they
do not want a polarized population (e.g., w3(·)) because that would increase the fraction of pro-
insurgent individuals, which the government does not want given it has the initial position of
power. Thus, the main take away from Figure 4.4 is that analysts should not arbitrarily assume
the population is homogeneous without further justification.
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Figure 4.4: Government victory threshold as a function of VI for several values of v(·)
We could make a plot similar to Figure 4.4 that has a curve for each of the five weighting
function. However, that figure is similar Figure 4.4 and provides the same insight, so we omit
it.
4.2.2 Support Received by Victorious Government
In this section, we present plots showing how the support received by the government varies
with the parameters. Here we assume the government strength is high enough so that it will
win. That is, VG is larger than the thresholds discussed in the previous subsection. In this
section, we plot SG(m∗) where m∗ is computed according to Proposition 5 and SG(m∗) is the
level of support the government will receive if it executes a lowest cost winning bribe. We plot
SG(m
∗) as a function of VI for fixed L, v(·), w(·).
As in Section 4.2.1, we first examine how the government victory threshold varies with L in
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Figure 4.5. The level of support increases in VI and in L in Figure 4.5, which is consistent with
Proposition 7. Figure 4.5b is not very interesting, because it corresponds to the government
advantage scenario where over 90% of the population has pro-government preferences. If the
government wins, all pro-government individuals will support the government (see Proposition
4). Thus the government will always have very high support in this case. Much of the param-
eter space in Figure 4.5b corresponds to case 1 or 2 in Proposition 4, where the government
supporters and the pro-government population are equivalent (i.e., SG(m∗) = W (θN)). Figures
4.5a and 4.5c are more interesting. The minimum possible support the government can receive
in Figure 4.5a is 0.5 and in Figure 4.5c this value is 0.0625. Note that there is a kink in the
L = 0.1 curve in Figure 4.5a around VI = 0.5. This corresponds to the government’s support-
ing coalition switching from a nonflooded coaltion to a flooded coalition (see Definitions 6 and
8).




























(a) Neutral: v1(θ), w1(θ)




























(b) Gov. advantage: v2(θ), w4(θ)




























(c) Insurgent advantage: v3(θ), w5(θ)
Figure 4.5: Government support level vs. VI
We omit showing the analog to Figure 4.4 because it provides the same insight as previous
examples. For a fixed weight function, the government will receive more support for preference
function v2(·) than for v1(·), and more support for preference function v1(·) than for v3(·). Also,
as we discussed in the previous subsection, the weighting function has a significant impact on
the results.
4.3 Coercion
In this section, we examine the affect of coercion on the government’s victory threshold and
the support level conditioned on government victory. To determine this, we must compute the
insurgents’ optimal level of coercion. In this section, we will focus on the flooded coalition
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case from Section 3.3.2. We use the same scenarios and parameters from Section 4.2, but must
define two additional parameters from Section 3.3.2: the coercion effectiveness function qG(α)
and the situational awareness parameter p. We consider the simple function qG(α) = 1 − α
and we vary p from 0.1 to 0.9. We first examine how coercion affects the government’s victory
threshold in Section 4.3.1 and then look at how the government’s support varies with coercion
in Section 4.3.2
4.3.1 Coercion’s Impact on the Government Victory Threshold
Coercion effectively reduces the preferences of the pro-government individuals because they
fear violent reprisals from the insurgents. Thus the government will need to offer a larger bribe
to these individuals to achieve the same level of “defense” to prevent the insurgents from of-
fering a compelling counter-bribe. As discussed in Section 3.3, coercion can backfire on the
insurgents by reducing the pro-insurgent population’s preferences. This makes it less costly
for the government to entice the pro-insurgent individuals to provide them with intelligence.
These conflicting effects of coercion are illustrated in Figure 4.6. For a given α, the govern-
ment victory threshold is given by TG(α) from equations (3.11a)–(3.11b). In Figure 4.6, we
plot this threshold against α for L = 0.4 and VI = 0.4. Each figure has curves correspond-
ing to a different level of the situational awareness parameter p. This figure illustrates several
important concepts. First, coercion is not universally good or bad for the insurgents. In the
government advantage case in Figure 4.6b, the insurgents want to ramp up coercion because
it has a significant impact. This is consistent with the discussion below Proposition 9, about
coercion being a powerful tool for weak insurgents. However, if the insurgents are in the posi-
tion of power (Figure 4.6c), coercion only serves to alienate the pro-insurgent population and
make victory more likely for the government. Finally there may be some “sweet spot” level
of coercion such as in Figure 4.6a, where coercion is effective for the insurgents up to a point.
However, after this point the insurgents push too far and coercion backfires. This is consistent
with the Anbar awakening where people speculate that the population finally snapped at the
brutal insurgents and decided to help the coalition forces defeat the insurgents [58] Figure 4.6
also illustrates the main finding of Proposition 11, which states the victory threshold increases
with the situational awareness parameter p. As the insurgents increase coercion the parame-
ter p can have a significant impact on the threshold. The purpose of Figure 4.6 is to illustrate
the three potential relationships between the threshold and coercion, and thus the y-axis of the
three subfigures are not the same. Examination of the y-axis values reveals that while coercion
can make a significant impact in the value of the threshold, the population’s preferences and
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weights plays a larger role. Thus if the government can take actions to shift the preferences (or
more unlikely weights), they should do that rather than spend those resources on reducing the
coercing effectiveness of the insurgents.




















(a) preference: v3(θ), weight: w4(θ)






















(b) Gov. advantage: v3(θ), w5(θ)



























(c) Insurgent advantage, v3(θ), w5(θ)
Figure 4.6: Government victory threshold vs. coercion. VI = 0.4 and L = 0.4
Next we plot the companion figure to Figure 4.3. That is, we plot the government victory
threshold as a function of VI . However, in Figure 4.7 we assume that the insurgents execute the
optimal amount of coercion. That is, they choose the α∗ to maximize the threshold (e.g., see
Figure 4.6). As suggested by Figure 4.6, we see the potentially significant impact of coercion in
Figure 4.7. Comparison with Figure 4.3 reveals the threshold increases dramatically in Figures
4.7a and 4.7b.
























(a) Neutral: v1(θ), w1(θ)
























(b) Gov. advantage: v2(θ), w4(θ)
























(c) Insurgent advantage: v3(θ), w5(θ)
Figure 4.7: The government victory threshold as a function of VI for several values of L, as-
suming the insurgents execute the optimal amount of coercion
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4.3.2 Coercion’s Impact on Government Support
In in this section, we examine how the government’s level of support varies with coercion. In
Figure 4.8 we set VI = 0.6, L = 0.1 and choose several values of p. We choose different
values for VI and L than those used to create figure 4.6 so that we can better see the effects of
coercion. We plot SG(m(α)) against α to see what impact coercion has on the level of support.
While there is not a monotonic relationship between α and TG(α)) (see figure 4.6), there is an
increasing relationship between α and SG(m(α)) in Figure 4.8. We proved this in Corollary
1. Coercion has minimal impact on the support level in the government advantage example in
Figure 4.8b because the support level must be at least 0.9375. However, this is conditional on the
insurgents winning after the coercion is executed. As discussed in Section 4.3.1, coercion has
a significant impact on the government’s ability to win in the government advantage scenario.
We see the same importance of the situational awareness parameter p in Figure 4.8 as we did in
Figure 4.6. Furthermore the support level decreases in the situational awareness parameter p,
which follows from case 3 of Proposition 7.






























(a) Neutral: v1(θ), w1(θ)






























(b) Gov. advantage: v2(θ), w4(θ)






























(c) Insurgent advantage: v3(θ), w5(θ)
Figure 4.8: Government support level vs. coercion. VI = 0.6 and L = 0.1
The analog of Figure 4.5 for the optimal level of coercion provides similar insight and so we
will not present that here.
4.4 Discrete Population
In this section, we examine a few scenarios for a discrete population. For consistency, we use the
same preference and weight functions from Section 4.1.1–4.1.2, but discretize the population




+ 0.125i] for 1 ≤ i ≤ 8. We
define the preference vi of tribe i to be v(θi) for θi corresponding to the right endpoint of the
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corresponding region (i.e., θi = −12 + 0.125i). We define the weight wi of tribe i to be the mass
in the region with respect to the density w(θ). We list the parameters for discrete versions of























Table 4.2: Tribe characteristics (Government Advantage Scenario)
We first plot the victory threshold vs. the insurgents’ strength VI in Figure 4.9 forL = 0.4 for the
discrete population and the continuous population. The curve corresponding to the continuous
population first appeared in Figure 4.3. To solve for the government’s optimal bribe for the
discrete population, and the corresponding victory threshold, we use the algorithm described in
Section A.6.2 of the Appendix.
The continuous and discrete scenarios are essentially equivalent in the neutral scenario in fig-
ure 4.9a. This agrees with the work of [29, 30] that found the continuous case and discrete












Table 4.3: Tribe characteristics (Insurgent Advantage Scenario)






















(a) Neutral: v1(θ), w1(θ)






















(b) Gov. advantage: v2(θ), w4(θ)






















(c) Insurgent advantage: v3(θ), w5(θ)
Figure 4.9: Government victory threshold: discrete vs. continuous population, L = 0.4.
4.9b–4.9c illustrate that nonuniform weights can have a significant impact on the results. This
occurs because the weight function plays a more important role in the discrete case since the
government and insurgents cannot gain the support of a fraction of the tribe, as they can in the
continuous case. We examined similar plots to figure 4.9 for different values of L with vari-
ous number of tribes. As expected from Proposition 7 and figure 4.3, the government victory
threshold increases with L for the discrete population. A further expected result is that the dif-
ference between the continuous and the discrete case is more pronounced for a smaller number
of tribes.
We next compare the level of support the government receives if it wins in figure 4.10. As
with figure 4.5, the level of support increases in L for the discrete population. However, the
support is not nondecreasing in VI as it is in the continuous case (see Proposition 7). This can
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(a) Neutral: v1(θ), w1(θ)




























(b) Gov. advantage: v2(θ), w4(θ)




























(c) Insurgent advantage: v3(θ), w5(θ)
Figure 4.10: Government support level: discrete vs. continuous population, L = 0.4.
be seen around θ = 0.15 in figure 4.10c. We defer further discussion of this issue until we
present figure 4.11 below. For most values of θ figure 4.10, the level of support is less for the
discrete population than the continuous population. In these situations, it is either to costly for
the government to gain more support, or the government does not need to create as large of a
buffer of support to prevent the insurgents from making a winning counter-bribe because the
insurgents have less flexibility.
We next address the issue illustrated in figure 4.10c: governmental support may decrease as VI
increases. This cannot occur in the continuous case, and we will further analyze this issue via a







Table 4.4: Tribe characteristics (Insurgent Advantage Scenario with four tribes)
We investigate the case where L = 0.4, and present the results in figure 4.11. In this scenario,
the government’s support clearly decreases as VI increases. By inspecting table 4.4, we can
see why this is the case. For the government to win, they need to have either tribe 4 or both
tribes 2 and 3 in the winning coalition. Tribe 1 is essentially worthless. For the example in
table 4.4, there are two possible optimal winning coalitions: tribes 1 and 4, or tribes 1, 2, and
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3. In the former case, the government receives intelligence from 0.5 of the population, and
in the latter case, the value is 0.562. If the government’s coalition contains tribes 1 and 4,
then the insurgents need to counter-bribe tribe 4. If the government’s coalition is tribes 1, 2,
and 3, then the insurgents need to counter-bribe either tribe 2 or 3 (not both), and therefore in
this case, the government will need to make tribes 2 and 3 equally costly for the insurgents to
counter-bribe. Bribing both tribes 2 and 3 is cost effective for low values of VI , because it is
very costly to convince tribe 4 to support the government. However, as VI increases eventually
(around VI = 0.23) it is too expensive for the government to continue bribing both tribes 2 and
3, and the government switches to optimally bribing only tribe 4. This causes the decrease in
Figure 4.11. This illustrates one potential counter-intuitive result that the discrete population
model can produce: as the insurgents become stronger the government targets the most extreme
pro-insurgent tribe.




























Figure 4.11: Government support level: discrete vs. continuous population with four tribes,
L = 0.4.
While we did not prove any specific results for the discrete population, Figures 4.9, 4.10 and
4.11 illustrate that the results differ, potentially considerably, from the continuous population.
Furthermore, the results are also more sensitive to the weights of the population in the discrete
case, and so it is important to expend effort and resources into making accurate estimates of
those values.
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The importance of winning the battle for popular support during insurgency conflicts demands
that the government have an effective strategy to engage with the population. The interaction
with the population is made more complex because the insurgents are an intelligent adversary.
If the government does not account for the countermeasures, the insurgents will implement to
stifle the flow of intelligence and support to the government, then the government will assuredly
lose this battle for the hearts and minds. In this thesis, we make a first attempt to formulate a
mathematical model based on political vote-buying models to capture the interactions amongst
the government, the insurgents, and the population. The purpose is to provide insight on this
topic and provide a base model upon which more complex and realistic analyses can be per-
formed.
The model focuses on three main topics. One is the minimum cost (or equivalently strength)
necessary for the government to win this conflict by receiving enough intelligence from the
population. The second topic is which individuals in the population will receive bribes from
the government and provide the government with intelligence. Finally, we examine the affect
of coercion and when it is an effective tool for the insurgents and when it may backfire. We in-
corporate a weighting function into our model that allows individuals or tribes to have different
influence within society.
Many of our results are not surprising. The likelihood the government will win decreases with
the strength of the insurgents and the amount of intelligence required for victory. The main
results from GS also apply to our model. These results are that government victory results in
excess support and that support for the government increases with the strength of the insur-
gents. We derive additional results that the support for the government increases with the level
of support required for victory and the support increases as the population’s preferences be-
come weaker. These results follow from the strategic nature of the game. The government must
ensure that the bribe it offers will withstand a counter-bribe by the insurgents. Only examin-
ing the problem from the government’s perspective using a decision analytic framework will
lead to different (and incorrect) results and conclusions. Coercion can increase or decrease the
likelihood that the government wins. For weak insurgents, it can be an effective tool because
they have very little to lose from the collateral damage the coercion may cause. While coercion
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may not have a monotonic effect for the insurgents, situational awareness does: the greater the
situational awareness of the insurgents, the fewer negative consequences from coercion. If the
government requires a large amount of support to achieve victory, then the insurgents should
decrease coercion. This follows because it is likely that the government will need support from
pro-insurgent individuals and the coercion can only alienate them, making it easier for the gov-
ernment to obtain their support. As the optimal amount of coercion may be some moderate
level, an interesting issue from a policy standpoint is whether there are actions that the govern-
ment can take to entice the insurgents into executing a suboptimal amount of coercion. Finally,
if the population consists of a discrete number of tribes that each make a decision to fully sup-
port the government or the insurgents, the problem is much more difficult to analyze. Many
of the results that apply for a continuous population no longer hold for the discrete population.
This issues highlights the importance of assigning weights to tribes. Greedy algorithms will
not produce the optimal answer and more complicated algorithms will need to be executed to
determine the government’s bribe.
Our model has many assumptions and simplifications that we now address. First, we assume
that the overall outcome of the interaction is binary: the insurgents win or the government
wins. The real outcome is the level of intelligence the government receives. Presumably more
intelligence is better for the government. A modified model might define the objective to be
the level of intelligence received by the government. The government wants to maximize this
quantity and the insurgents want to minimize it. However, this binary assumption may not be
that unrealistic as an initial formulation. The government’s ability to defeat the insurgents as a
function of intelligence may resemble a step function. Furthermore, we only examine the role of
popular support in providing intelligence to the government. The population can provide active
support to the insurgents in the form of finances, resources, and sanctuary [42]. We feel that
focusing initially on the the intelligence piece is valid because the government forces, in most
cases, have superior military capabilities and they only need intelligence to effectively target
insurgents with force [49].
This model assumes that the net preference function v(·) is known by the insurgents and the
government and that bribes can be tailored to each individual. This may be plausible if the
population consists of a handful of tribes, but not if it is thousands (or more) of unique indi-
viduals. A more realistic model might restrict the government to offering the same bribe to all
individuals. Another assumption is the two-period sequential nature of the game. While this
does make the analysis much simpler than a simultaneous Colonel Blotto variant, there is some
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justification for this. In the sequential game structure the player who moves last has a strategic
advantage, and thus neither player wants to move first. If the insurgents are entrenched in an
area, they have no incentive to change the status quo. Only after observing the actions of the
government will they make a counter-offer. This puts the insurgents in a position of advantage,
which is appropriate. Even if the government is in control of the area, they have much more to
lose than the insurgents and may be conservative with their strategy. The government may still
make the initial offer to prevent an insurgency from growing or taking root in an area. While the
sequential component may be reasonable, there will be repeated interactions over time, and pos-
sibly learning occurring as there will be incomplete information. Future work should consider
multiple interactions.
The model relies on the ability to enforce an individual’s decision. If the individual accepts a
bribe, it will support that side. In political science, this is referred to as an open ballot. This
is a reasonable assumption in our model, because the government observes informants and the
insurgents may have some idea about who is helping the government. Our implementation of
coercion assumes that the preferences of all individuals are decreased by the same proportion.
This was primarily done for analytic convenience, and while it is a reasonable first cut there are
other potential formulations (see e.g., [37]). We also assume that the insurgents have to commit
to their level of coercion at the beginning of the interaction and cannot change this, which is not
realistic. It might be more realistic to assume that the insurgents observe the government’s bribe
and then the insurgents choose some combination of coercion level and counter-bribe. Future
research should consider more appropriate implementations of coercion. Furthermore, we do
not assume a cost to implementing coercion. Although we could incorporate a coercion cost, it
would complicate the model without providing much additional insight. A further shortcoming
of the model is the passive nature of the population. Adding a strategic component to the popu-
lation would strengthen the model. While we do account for part of the social structure through
the weight function, there is still much of the social dynamics we do not model. Tribes or in-
dividuals will influence each other via the underlying social network, and this can potentially
play a significant role on the amount of intelligence the government receives.
The previous paragraphs list many of the shortcomings of the model and there are many more
that we do not list. However, to the best of our knowledge, this thesis is the first attempt to an-
alyze insurgencies with a vote-buying framework. In some sense, this work represents the start
more than the finish, as there is much more that could be done. Many potential improvements
were listed in the previous paragraphs, so we will not repeat them here. The most immediate
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improvement would be to examine the discrete case in more rigorous detail. We have postu-
lated an algorithm that should solve for the government’s optimal bribe for a small number of
tribes, but it is rather incomplete. More interesting extensions would have the population play
an active and strategic part in the interaction. The population benefits from the conflict between
the government and insurgents because they receive bribes. However, in practice the population
might be able to play the government and the insurgents off each other to extract even more.
For example: in the discrete setting, tribes could collude and merge to create a combined tribe
that is more attractive than either of the separate tribes. In the current model, the transaction for
support does not depend upon the actual outcome of the conflict. In practice, the government
could make promises to the population about what the government will provide them if it can
defeat the insurgents and can control the given territory. This idea is motivated by the work of
[31], which examines the impact of campaign promises in elections.
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In the Appendix, we provide the proofs and arguments supporting the main results in the thesis.
Many of these proofs are somewhat tedious, and where possible we have provided qualitative
and intuitive arguments in Section 3 to explain and motivate these technical arguments. In
Section A.1, we discuss some of the technical issues with the two-player game under analysis.
In Section A.2, we present the primary notation used in Sections A.3 – A.4, which present the
analysis for the insurgent and government’s strategy, respectively. In Section A.5, we discuss
coercion, and finally in Section A.6, we examine the discrete model.
A.1 Technical Considerations
As this is a two player sequential game, we must compute Nash Equilibria (technically subgame
perfect Nash Equilibria). As we only consider 2 periods, this can be done via backward induc-
tion. We first start with the insurgents’ response to the government bribe bG(θ) and compute the
optimal counter-bribe b∗I(θ) as a function of bG(θ). This is discussed in Section A.3. Once this
optimal response strategy is determined, we can calculate the government’s optimal initial bribe
b∗G(θ), which must account for the insurgents’ optimal counter-bribe. We examine the govern-
ment’s bribe in Section A.4. The strategies of the government and insurgent are functions bG(θ)
and bI(θ) on the domain of individuals θ ∈ [−12 , 12 ]. As the strategy space is not a finite or
discrete set, we mention some technical issues that may arise in the analysis.
For any bribe bG(θ) there are an infinite number of equivalent bribes that differ from bG(θ)
on a set of measure 0. This issue is not important for our purposes and we will ignore it.
Furthermore, because the insurgents move second there are many potential “losing” counter-
bribes that are technically equilibria. Individuals will only accept the bribe from the party that
offers the more compelling bribe. Thus, if the insurgents realize they will lose, then it is optimal
for them to offer a counter-bribe that will be of zero cost. Obviously, the bribe bI(θ) = 0
satisfies this condition. However, technically, other counter-bribes that are less compelling
than the government’s bribe could also be offered, knowing that they would be rejected by
the population. These counter-bribes would also be optimal counter-bribes by the insurgents,
because they do not have to actually execute the counter-bribes and so are zero cost. We also
ignore these strategies and just focus on the interesting bribe of zero bI(θ) = 0. We can avoid
these meaningless bribes by making an assumption that offering a non-zero bribe has some
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negligible cost, and this will result in the unique counter-bribe of b∗I(θ) = 0 when the insurgents
want to concede.
This assumption of assuming a negligible cost to offering a bribe is also useful for dealing with
ties. We assume that the government will only execute a bribe if the total cost is less than VG
and, similarly, the insurgents will only execute a bribe if it costs less than VI . If the bribe costs
exactly VG (or VI), the bribe will not be offered because of this negligible extra cost. This
allows us to assume that an optimal strategy for the government will be a bribe that will cost the
insurgents exactly VI to counteract, and hence the insurgents will not make a counter-offer. If
the government offers a bribe that costs the insurgents less than VI to successfully counter-bribe,
then it will be insufficient to deter the insurgents; if it costs the insurgents more than VI to win
the government is incurring unnecessary cost with its original bribe. Finally, we assume that if
an individual is indifferent between the government and insurgents (i.e., v(θ) + bI(θ) = bG(θ)),
they will support the insurgents. Thus in practice if the insurgents make a positive bribe to an
individual θ the bribe will satisfy bI(θ) = bG(θ)− v(θ).
A.2 Notation
This section introduces notation used in this Appendix (primarily in Sections A.3 – A.4) and
describes the qualitative meaning behind some of the parameters. Suppose that the government
makes a bribe of bG(θ). Define
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BG = {θ : bG(θ) > 0} (A.1c)
ATL = {θ : 0 < v˜(θ) < T} (A.1d)
ATE = {θ : v˜(θ) = T} (A.1e)





T ∗(K) = inf{T :
∫
AT
w(θ)dθ ≥ K}, K ≤ SG (A.1h)
A(K) ∈ {Aˆ ⊂ AT ∗(K)E :
∫
Aˆ






We now give the qualitative description of these terms. The function v˜(θ) is the population’s
utility if they accept the government’s bribe and support the government. The quantity SG
is the fraction of the population that supports the government under the government’s bribe
bG(θ) without a counteroffer from the insurgents. Similarly, the support STG is the amount of
the government’s supporters with preferences strictly less than T . BG is the set of individuals
that receive a bribe from the government. The quantity ATL is the set of individuals in the
population whose utility from accepting the government’s bribe of bG(θ) is strictly less than T .
The analogous quantity ATE is the set of individuals in the population whose utility is exactly T .
T ∗(K) is the smallest threshold, such that the insurgents will gain at least a fraction K of the
government’s supporters if the insurgents make a successful counter-bribe to all government




primarily used in Section A.3 to derive the insurgents’ counter-bribe.




win. This is the motivation for the value A(K). If
∫
AT
∗(K) w(θ)dθ > K, then the insurgents
only need to bribe A(K) ⊂ AT ∗(K)E to obtain the necessary mass of K. Since all individuals in
the set AT
∗(K)
E require a counter-bribe of T
∗(K) from the insurgents, the subset A(K) will not
be unique (in general there will be an infinite number of these subsets). The insurgents need to
choose the subset A(K) so that the total mass they obtain from ATL and A(K) is K.
A.3 Insurgents’ Strategy
In this section, we present the proofs for the propositions in section 3.2.2. We first prove
Proposition 1 by proving Lemma 1. The threshold defined in Proposition 1 corresponds to
T ∗(SG − L) in equation (A.1h), the sets defined in Proposition 1 correspond to AT
∗(SG−L)
L
(equation (A.1d)) and AT
∗(SG−L)
E (equation (A.1e)), and the subset described in Proposition 1
corresponds to A(SG − L) (equation (A.1i))
Lemma 1. Suppose the government makes an initial bribe bG(θ). A lowest cost bribe for the
insurgents to capture 0 ≤ K ≤ SG of the government’s supporter is to give a payment of
bI(θ) = v˜(θ) for θ ∈ AT
∗(K)
L ∪ A(K) and a bribe bI(θ) = 0 for θ /∈ AT
∗(K)




w(θ)dθ = 0 this bribe is unique. The quantities AT
∗(K)
L , A(K), A
T ∗(K)
E are defined in
section A.2.
Proof. Suppose that the insurgents’ low cost counter-bribe involves bribes to the set B. First, it
must be that v˜(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ B because making payments to supporters of the insurgents
cannot decrease the level of support for the government. Second, if the insurgents must convince
K of the government’s supporter to switch allegiances then
∫
B
w(θ)dθ ≥ K. The set AT ∗(K)L ∪
A(K) satisfies these two conditions by construction. To showAT
∗(K)
L ∪A(K) is a lowest cost set
of individuals the insurgents can bribe to obtain K, we first show that a set B such B 6⊂ AT ∗(K)
cannot be lower cost. To do this, first assume that there is another set B such that B 6⊂ AT ∗(K),
v˜(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ B, and ∫
B








where condition (A.2b) states that it costs less to bribe the set B than AT
∗(K)
L ∪ A(K). We
partition B into two subsets B1 = B ∩ (AT
∗(K)
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w(θ)dθ = K. However by construction infθ∈B2 v˜(θ) ≥ T ∗(K) ≥






Which is a contradiction. Therefore the lowest cost set B of individuals must satisfy B ⊂
AT
∗(K). An analogous argument shows that the insurgents will first bribe all the individuals in
A
T ∗(K)
L and if necessary a subset A(K) ⊂ AT
∗(K)
E to reach the necessary mass of K. This holds
because inf
θ∈AT∗(K)E
v˜(θ) = T ∗(K) ≥ sup
θ∈AT∗(K)L
v˜(θ). Thus, the most cost effective way to
gain the support of K of the government’s supporters is to only bribe individuals in AT ∗(K).






w(θ)dθ = 0, then the set to bribe will be the unique set AT
∗(K)
L because A(K) is a
measure 0 set.
Lemma 1 describes a lowest cost counter-bribe by the insurgents. In the next proposition,
which corresponds to Proposition 2 in Section 3.2.2, we summarize when the insurgents should
execute this bribe. The set D in Proposition 2 in Section 3.2.2 corresponds to AT
∗(K)
L ∪ A(K).
Proposition 14. Suppose the government makes a bid bG(θ) then a best response of the insur-
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gents is to bid bI(θ) given by
bI(θ) =0q if T ∗(SG − L) = 0 (A.5a)





v˜(θ)w(θ)dθ > VI (A.5b)
bI(θ) =v˜(θ)q for θ ∈ AT
∗(K)
L ∪ A(K)





v˜(θ)w(θ)dθ < VI (A.5c)
Proof. The expression (A.5a) corresponds to the government not having enough support to win.
If T ∗(SG−L) = 0 then SG < L, and thus the insurgents do not need to make any bribes to win.
The expression (A.5b) states that the government has enough support to win absent insurgent
support (T ∗(SG − L) > 0). However, by Lemma 1, the cheapest way for the insurgents to
gain SG − L of the government’s supporters is to bribe a set AT
∗(K)
L ∪ A(K). By assumption





v˜(θ)w(θ)dθ is worth more
than the insurgents value the victory. Thus the insurgents do not make a counter-bribe and
concede the victory to the government. The final case in expression (A.5c) is the same as case
in expression (A.5b), but the insurgents now value the victory (VI) more than it will cost to
attain it. Thus the insurgents make their most cost effective bribe to the population (see Lemma
1) by setting bI(θ) = v˜(θ) for θ ∈ AT
∗(K)
L ∪ A(K) and bI(θ) = 0 for θ /∈ AT
∗(K)
L ∪ A(K). In
this case the insurgents win.
Finally, an optimal bribe by the government can always be formulated as a leveling bribe (see
Proposition 3 of Section 3.2.3 in Section A.4.1) where v˜(θ) is nonincreasing. Corollary 2 defines
the insurgents’ optimal response for that case.
Corollary 2. If the government makes a bid bG(θ) such that the function v˜(θ) is nonincreasing
then a best response of the insurgents is to bid bI(θ) given by
bI(θ) = 0q if θN < θL (A.6a)
bI(θ) = 0q if θN ≥ θL and
∫ θN
θL
v˜(θ)w(θ)dθ > VI (A.6b)
bI(θ) = v˜(θ)q for θ ∈ [θL, θN ]
q if θN ≥ θL and
∫ θN
θL
v˜(θ)w(θ)dθ < VI (A.6c)
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where θN = v˜−1(0),
Proof. If v˜(θ) is nonincreasing, then T ∗(SG − L) = max(v˜(θL), 0) and AT
∗(K)
L ∪ A(K) =
[θL, θN ]. Equations (A.6a)–(A.6c) then follow immediately from (A.5a)–(A.5c). Recall by





In this section, we examine the government’s strategy and prove the results from Section 3.2.3.
Before presenting the analysis, we define what a dominated strategy is in this context. Obvi-
ously, the government will never consider a dominated strategy.
Definition 9. Dominated strategy: bG(θ) is dominated by a bribe b′G(θ) if one of the two con-
ditions holds
• The cost for the government to execute bG(θ) is more than the cost to execute b′G(θ), and
the lowest-cost winning insurgent counter-bribe to bG(θ) costs no more to implement than
the corresponding counter-bribe to b′G(θ).
• The lowest-cost winning insurgent counter-bribe to bG(θ) costs less to implement than the
corresponding counter-bribe to b′G(θ), and the cost for the government to execute bG(θ)
is no less than the cost to execute b′G(θ).
Definition 9 states a bribe by the government is dominated if another bribe exists that costs less
for the government to implement and costs more for the insurgents to defeat. Before examining
the specific nature of the government’s optimal bribe in Section A.4.2, we first prove that an
optimal strategy for the government is a leveling strategy in Section A.4.1. We discuss the low
cost bribe in Section A.4.3 and how the the government’s level of support varies with the model
parameters in Sections A.4.4–A.4.5.
A.4.1 Leveling Strategy
Here we show a leveling strategy is optimal. We first present Lemmas 2 and 3 which show that
the government’s optimal strategy can always be constructed such that the set of individuals the






Lemma 2. If the government makes an optimal bribe b∗G(θ) then the set of the individuals bribed
by the government must satisfy BG ⊂ AT ∗(SG−L).
Proof. If the government makes an optimal bribe and BG 6⊂ AT ∗(SG−L), this implies there is
some set C ⊂ BG such that v˜(θ) > T ∗(SG − L) for all θ ∈ C. Thus, the government could
decrease its bribe of the individuals in C by some  (possibly depending upon θ) and these
individuals would still not be in AT ∗(SG−L), and hence would not effect the potential counter-
bribe of the insurgents. This modified bribe would be less costly than the original bribe, and thus
the original bribe could not have been optimal since it was a dominated strategy (see Definition
9).
Lemma 3. If the government makes an optimal bribe b∗G(θ) to the population, then the set of
the individuals bribed by the government can always be constructed as a range of individuals
in the population: BG = [θ, θ¯] for some θ and θ¯.
Proof. We first assume the government makes an optimal bribe b∗G(θ) such that θ = infθ BG,
θ¯ = supθ BG and there is some C ⊂ [θ, θ¯] such that C ∩ BG = ∅. We now show a modified
bribe that does bribe the individuals in C cannot perform worse than b∗G(θ).
We further assume there is some κ > 0 such that [θ, θ+κ] ⊂ BG. This rules out the government
making a measure zero point bribe to individual θ without making a bribe to any of her neigh-
bors in a sufficiently small neighborhood. If this assumption does not hold, then because this is
a measure zero bribe we can set b∗G(θ) = 0 and remove this individual from BG and compute a
new θ. We now define θC = infθ C. By construction θC > θ + κ. Because we assume v(θ) is
continuous and decreasing and [θ, θ + κ] ⊂ BG, then
inf
θ∈[θ,θ+κ]
v˜(θ) > v˜(θC) = v(θC). (A.7)
By Lemma 2 BG ⊂ AT ∗(SG−L) and thus T ∗(SG − L) ≥ supθ∈[θ,θ+κ] v˜(θ) > v(θC). The last
inequality following from equation(A.7). We will now choose a δ and  and define a modified
bribe b′G(θ);
b′G(θ) =
b∗G(θ)− δ for θ ∈ BG for θ ∈ C. (A.8)
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We will show that for the right choice of δ and , the new bribe schedule b′G(θ) defined by
equation (A.8) is a better bribe than b∗G(θ) and hence b
∗
G(θ) cannot be optimal. That is, b
′
G(θ)
weakly dominates b∗G(θ) (see Definition 9). To avoid confusion. we will use T
∗(SG − L) to
denote the threshold associated with the bribe b∗G(θ) and T
′(SG − L) to denote the threshold








This ensures the new bribe b′G(θ) is the same cost for the government to implement as b
∗
G(θ).
By Lemma 2 and condition (A.7), v(θC) < T ∗(SG − L) for the original bribe b∗G(θ), and
thus C ⊂ AT ∗(SG−L)L for b∗G(θ). By Lemma 1, this means that the insurgents would bribe
all of C in a lowest cost counter-bribe to b∗G(θ). If we set δ and  small enough such that
infθ∈[θ,θ+κ](v˜(θ) − δ) > v(θC) +  (which is possible by condition (A.7)), then v(θC) +  <
T ′(SG−L) for the modified bribe b′G(θ). Thus, C ⊂ AT
′(SG−L)
L for the new bribe b
′
G(θ) and the








equality in (A.9) holds for the insurgents. However, the insurgents do not necessarily need to
make a counter-bribe to everyone in BG to win. Lemma 2 only states that the individuals in BG
will be under consideration for a bribe (i.e., AT ∗(SG−L)), not that they would necessarily receive
one (which would be AT
∗(SG−L)
L ∪A(SG −L) by Lemma 1). The insurgents only need to bribe





w(θ)dθ. The term on the left hand side
of the preceding inequality follows because the insurgents will always bribe C by construction.










The left hand side of (A.10) is the decrease in the cost the insurgents’ low cost counter-bribe as
a result of b′G(θ) and the right hand side is the additional cost to increase the bribe to C. Thus,
if the government implements b′G(θ), the lowest cost counter-bribe by the insurgents cannot be
smaller than the one determined by b∗G(θ). Therefore an optimal bribe can always be formulated
as BG = [θ, θ¯].
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Below we present the proof for Proposition 3 of Section 3.2.3. This proposition states that the
bribe for the insurgents can always be constructed as a leveling bribe. This allows us to focus
only on those types of bribing strategies for the government.
Proof. We define v−1(a) = −1
2
for a > v(−1
2
). First, we will show that an optimal bribe bG(θ)
exists such that v˜(θ) = a for θ ∈ BG. That is, all individuals that are bribed by the government
are bribed such that they are equally expensive for the insurgents to counter-bribe. The argument
is similar to that in Lemma 3. We assume that there is some optimal bribe b∗G(θ) such that v˜(θ) is
not constant for θ ∈ BG. For notational simplicity, let us define T = T ∗(SG−L) from equation
(A.1h) to be the threshold associated with the bribe b∗G(θ). First, by Lemma 2 BG ⊂ AT and
thus v˜(θ) ≤ T for θ ∈ BG. Since v˜(θ) is not constant, this implies there exist some set C ⊂ BG
such that supθ∈C v˜(θ) < T − κ for some small κ. We will derive a contradiction by showing
that for an optimal bribe v˜(θ) ≥ T for θ ∈ BG.
The argument follows the same mechanics as in Lemma 3 so we will just sketch the argument.
For a given δ and , we modify the bribe such that b′G(θ) = b
∗
G(θ)− δ for BG \ C and b′G(θ) =








This ensures that it costs the government the same amount to implement b∗G(θ) and b
′
G(θ).
Because supθ∈C v˜(θ) < T , under b∗G(θ) we have C ⊂ ATL and thus by Lemma 1 the insurgents
would target C in any counter-bribe to b∗G(θ). We now define T
′ to be the threshold from
equation (A.1h) associated with the modified bribe b′G(θ). If δ and  are small enough, then
supθ∈C v˜(θ) < T
′ −  and thus C ⊂ AT ′L and the insurgents would also C target in any lowest




w(θ)dθ. As in Lemma 3, the insurgents will not necessarily need to bribe
everyone in BG \ C to win, and thus the lowest cost bribe of the insurgents for the modified
bribe b′G(θ) would decrease by at most δ
∫
BG\C w(θ)dθ. Thus, the modified bribe b
′
G(θ) weakly
dominates the original bribe b∗G(θ), because this bribe is the same cost to the government and
cannot decrease the cost to the insurgents to respond (see Definition 9). This proves that an
optimal bribe given by the government can be constructed as a leveling bribe such that v˜(θ) is
flat on BG.
We will define v˜(θ) = a on BG for some a. From Lemma 3, we know BG is an interval, which
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we define to be [d,m]. We now show that d = v−1(a). Because v(θ) is decreasing, b∗G(θ) is
positive, and v˜(θ) = a on [d,m] it must be that a ≥ v(d). If we assume that a = v(d) + β for
some β > 0, then we can define the set E = [v−1(a − β
2
), d]. By construction, E receives no









v˜(θ) = a. (A.12)
Thus by Lemma 1, the insurgents would bribe the members of E in a lowest cost counter-bribe.
However, now we can make the same δ/ argument to reduce the bribe in BG by δ and increase
the bribe in E by , and this will result in a modified bribe that weakly dominates the original
bribe. Therefore, we can always construct a leveling bribe of height a such that d = v−1(a).
Clearly, if a > v(−1
2
), then there is a leveling bribe on the interval [−1
2
,m] and hence the logical
definition v−1(a) = −1
2
for a > v(−1
2
).
Finally, if θL > θN , then in an optimal bribe m ≥ θL > θN . If θL ≤ θN , then it is not optimal
for m < θN . If m < θN then we can construct a δ/ argument with BG and C = [m, θN ]
and reduce the bribes in BG by δ and bribe the individuals C an amount . The cost to the
government would remain the same, but the cost to the insurgents would weakly increase.
A.4.2 Government Bribe
We now prove Proposition 4 in Section 3.2.3. This presents the general form of the govern-
ment’s low cost bribe, assuming that VG is large enough for the government to win.
Proof. We look at each of the four cases separately.
Case 1
Assume θL < θN and VI ≤
∫ θN
θL
v(θ)w(θ)dθ. If the government offers no bribe to the pop-
ulation (i.e., bG(θ) = 0), then the insurgents need to buy off a fraction W (θN) − L of the
pro-government population. By Corollary 2, the lowest cost way to do this is to bribe the indi-
viduals on the interval θ ∈ [θL, θN ]. This would cost
∫ θN
θL
v(θ)w(θ)dθ, which is larger than the
value of the victory to the insurgents, VI . Thus, the insurgents do attempt to bribe any individ-
uals because the cost of victory is too high. Anticipating this, the government makes no offers,
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so b∗G(θ) = 0.
Case 2
Suppose that θL < θN and
∫ θN
θL
v(θ)w(θ)dθ ≤ VI ≤ v(θL)
∫ θN
θL
w(θ)dθ. First, the government
will never make an offer to any individuals with θ < θL. The logic follows from from Lemma
2. For the government to bribe individuals with θ < θL would require those individuals to be
in AT ∗(SG−L). This can only occur if v(θ) + bG(θ) > v(θL) for all θ ∈ [θL, θN ]. However, this




thus the government could decrease its bribes for θ ∈ [θL, θN ] and still defeat the insurgents.
Next, we show that the government will never bribe any individuals θ > θN . If the government




(v(θ) + bG(θ))w(θ)dθ = VI , because that is the cost of the lowest cost counter-bribe
by the insurgents. The total cost to the government to execute the bribe will be∫ θN
θL




If instead the government bribes a certain set B ⊂ [θL, θN ] and C ⊂ [θN , 12 ], then we have the
the cost of bribes being∫
B∪C







Because v(θ) < 0 for θ ∈ C, the right hand side of (A.14) is larger than the right hand side of
(A.13), and so it will cost the government more to bribe individuals θ > θN .
We have shown that the government will only bribe individuals for θ ∈ [θL, θN ]. Equation
(A.13) specifies the minimum cost of the optimal bribe. There are many potential bribes that
will satisfy the condition. However, by Proposition 3 of Section 3.2.3 there exists an optimal
leveling bribe, which is the one we will focus. By continuity of w(θ) and the assumption of this





w(θ) = VI (A.15)
Once we compute this a, then the bribe bG(θ) = a − v(θ) for θ ∈ [v−1(a), θN ] satisfies equa-
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tion (A.13). To see why, we can compute such an a, we define the left hand side of equa-
tion (A.15) as f(a). By the assumption of this case, f(0) ≤ VI ≤ f(v(θL)). Furthermore,
f ′(a) =
∫ θN
v−1(a)w(θ) ≥ 0 and thus by the intermediate value theorem there is a unique solution
a to (A.15) and hence a unique optimal leveling bribe for the government.
Case 3
By Proposition 3 of Section 3.2.3, the government’s optimal bribe b∗G(θ) can always be con-
structed as a leveling bribe such that b∗G(θ) satisfies v˜(θ) = v(θ)+b
∗
G(θ) = a for θ ∈ [v−1(a),m].
Because this bribe produces a nonincreasing function v˜(θ), by Corollary 2 the lowest cost
counter-bribe will cost a
∫ m
θL
w(θ)dθ = a(SG(m) − L). Therefore, the government’s lowest
cost bribe must set this cost to VI to deter the insurgents from making a counteroffer. Thus, to




The preceding calculations assumed that v−1(a) ≤ θL or a ≥ v(θL). We will now show that
must be true. If we assume that a < v(θL), then we can make a δ/ argument similar to those
used in Lemma 3 and Proposition 3 of Section 3.2.3 to show this is not an optimal bribe by the
government. To do this, we look at a modified bribe schedule b′G(θ) that will reduce m by δ
and increase a by . We will choose  and δ, such that the cost for the insurgents to make a
successful counter-bribe would cost the same under b∗G(θ) and b
′
G(θ). Note that under b
′
G(θ),
the insurgents would target individuals for θ ∈ [θL,m − δ] in a counter-bribe for  and δ small










(a+ − v(θ))w(θ)dθ (A.17)
The value on the left-hand side is the reduction in the lowest cost counter-bribe of the insurgents
now that that they do not have to bribe individuals in θ ∈ [m − δ,m], and the right hand side
is the increase in the cost to the insurgents to bribe the individuals θ ∈ [v−1(a + ),m − δ].
A δ/ combination can always be calculated to satisfy equation (A.17), and they can be made
small enough such that the lowest cost insurgent counter-bribe will still only target individuals
θ ∈ [θL,m−δ]. By construction of (A.17), the insurgents will pay the same amount to optimally
respond to b′G(θ) as they would to the original bribe b
∗
G(θ). However, the government will pay
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less for this modified bribe. First, in this scenario m > θN . This follows because in this case
we are assuming a < v(θL) and we know that VI > v(θL)
∫ θN
θL
w(θ)dθ, so the insurgents would
win if m = θN . Therefore, in this scenario an optimal bribe must involve m > θN . Next the
government must pay an additional amount equal to the right hand side of (A.17) according to
this modified bribe b′G(θ). However, the amount they save by not having to bribe θ ∈ [m−δ,m]
is
∫ m
m−δ(a − v(θ))w(θ)dθ. Because m > θN , δ can be chosen such that m − δ > θN and so∫ m
m−δ −v(θ)w(θ)dθ > 0 and the government’s reduction in cost to implement b′G(θ) is more
than the left hand side of (A.17). Thus the modified bribe b′G(θ) costs less to implement than
b∗G(θ), and the modified bribe dominates the original (see Definition 9). Therefore,
a =
VI
SG(m)− L ≥ v(θL), (A.18)
and equation (A.16) is valid and defines the optimal leveling bribe. Finally by Proposition 3 of
Section 3.2.3, m ≥ θN .
Case 4
The logic is exactly the same as the beginning of Case 3. The government will implement a





We do not need to justify a ≥ v(θL) because v(θL) < 0 in this case. We know that m > θL by
Proposition 6.
A.4.3 Government’s Low Cost Bribe
Here we prove Prop 5 in Section 3.2.3 by calculating m∗ .
Proof. The height of the leveling bribe H(m) is defined in equation (3.6) in Section 3.2.3. We
can define its inverse because v(θ) is continuous and strictly decreasing and w(θ) is continuous.









if x ≥ VI
1−L
=∞ if x < VI
1−L
(A.20)
The second term in (A.20) is necessary because the height of the bribe must be at least VI
1−L for


























Recall that by definition SG(m) = W (m). First TG(m) is continuous on (max(θN , θL), 12) for
each separate region defined by (A.21a) and (A.21b). This follows because v(θ) is continuous
strictly decreasing, and thus v−1(θ) is strictly increasing and continuous, w(θ) is continuous,
and hence so are W (m), SG(m), and H(m). We can see that TG(m) is also continuous at the






by substituting this value into both equation (A.21a) and (A.21b)
and verifying they produce the same result. Next, we differentiate TG(m) to analyze its behavior


























This follows through straightforward (though a bit tedious) differentiation. To compute (A.22a)–















The derivative T ′G(m) defined by (A.22a)–(A.22b) is continuous by continuity of v(·), w(·),




into both (A.22a) and (A.22b) the values coincide and so the derivative is well defined at the
boundary value between the flooded and non-flooded coalition cases.
We next show that there is at most one local minimum of TG(m). The function TG(m) is
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not concave because of the weight function w(θ), however we can show that there exists an
m∗ such that T ′G(m) < 0 for m < m
∗ and T ′G(m) > 0 for m > m
∗ and thus there is a
local minimum at m∗. Therefore, the government needs to only consider m = m∗ or the two
endpoints m = max(θN , θL) and m = 12 .
To do this, let us first consider the flooded coalition case by examining the term in parentheses
in equation (A.22a):
f(m) = − H(m)
(SG(m)− L)L− v(m) (A.24)
Because m ≥ θN , it follows that −v(m) ≥ 0 for all feasible m. Thus, the first term of (A.24)
is negative and the second term is nonegative (and will be positive for all m > θN by the strict
monotonicity of v(θ)). We will next argue that f(m) is increasing in m. Once we establish this,
it follows that since f(m) is increasing inm there will be at most onem∗ such that f(m) < 0 for
m < m∗ and f(m) > 0 form > m∗. It is possible that f(m) is either positive or negative for all
m in our region of interest. Sincew(m) ≥ 0, the sign of f(m) is the sign of T ′G(m) and the value
m∗ such that f(m∗) = 0 (if it exists) is a local minimizer of TG(m). We need not consider roots
of w(·), because they correspond to saddle points. Thus, TG(m) will either be nonincreasing,














monotonicity of v(m), −v(m2) > −v(m1) and because H(m) is decreasing in m and SG(m)




f(m1) = − H(m1)
(SG(m1)− L)L− v(m1) < −
H(m2)
(SG(m2)− L)L− v(m2) = f(m2), (A.25)
and f(m) is increasing. We can perform the exact same analysis on the term in parentheses in
equation (A.22b):
r(m) = − H(m)
(SG(m)− L)
(
L−W (v−1 (H(m))))− v(m), (A.26)
and show that r(m) is also increasing in m. Thus TG(m) will either be increasing, decreasing,







We next argue it is impossible for TG(m) to have two local minima on [max(θN , θL), 12 ]: one














]. This follows from inspection of
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equations (A.24) and (A.26). We can rewrite r(m) in terms of f(m) and some positive quantity



















by the monotonicity of f(m) and r(m)















We have shown that there is at most one local minimum to TG(m). We now rule out the lower
endpoint m = max(θN , θL) as a potential optimal value for the government. Substituting m =
θN into equation (A.22a) results in T ′G(m) < 0 because v(θN) = 0. Evaluating limm↓θL T
′
G(m)
shows that T ′G(m) < 0 in a neighborhood of θL because the first term in equation (A.22a) blows
up.
Therefore, we are left with two options for the optimal cost minimizing choice m∗ for the
government. Either m∗ corresponds to the unique local minimizer of TG(θ), or m∗ = 12 . The
latter case corresponds to Case 3 of Proposition 5 in Section 3.2.3. If the optimal solution is the
local minimum, then it will either be the root of f(m) in equation (A.24) (which corresponds
to Case 2 of Proposition 5 in Section 3.2.3), or it will be the root of r(m) in equation (A.26)
(which corresponds to Case 1 of Proposition 5 in Section 3.2.3).
A.4.4 Excess Support
In this section, we prove Proposition 6 in Section 3.2.3. If the government wins, it will receive
more than the minimal amount of support then it requires for victory.
Proof. This proposition is only interesting if θL ≥ θN . As Proposition 3 of Section 3.2.3 states,
the optimal strategy of the government is a leveling strategy such that the government will
receive support on some interval [1
2
,m] for m ≥ θN . Thus if θL < θN , if the government wins
SG > L. Now consider θL ≥ θN . In this case let us assume that the government pays a finite
leveling bribe bG(θ) such that v(θ) + bG(θ) = a and SG = L + . The insurgents only need
to buy a fraction  of the government’s supporters to win. By Corollary 2, the insurgents will
bribe the least costly individuals θ ∈ [θL,m], where by construction
∫
[θL,m]
w(θ)dθ = . The
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cost to the insurgents to counter-bribe these individuals and win is
∫
[θL,m]
v˜(θ)w(θ)dθ = a. For
a fixed a, lim→0 a = 0 and condition (A.6c) of Proposition 2 will eventually hold for some
small  and the insurgents will win. Therefore, in order for the government to ensure victory
a → ∞ as  → 0. However, the government has the constraint VG, and so for large enough
a, the government would concede rather than implementing the bribe to win. Thus, for  small
enough, the government cannot prevent an insurgent victory. Therefore, if the government wins,
they cannot have an excess support arbitrarly close to 0.
A.4.5 How Government’s Strategy Varies With Parameters
To prove cases 1–3 of Proposition 7 in Section 3.2.5 we first prove the following Lemma
Lemma 4. The bribe parameter m∗ corresponding to the upper bound of the set BG has the
following properties.
1. m∗ is nondecreasing in VI .
2. m∗ is nondecreasing in L.
3. m∗ is nondecreasing if the population’s preferences shift from v1(θ) to v2(θ) and |v2(θ)| <
|v1(θ)|.
Proof. We examine each case separately.
Case 1:
To see that m∗ is nondecreasing in VI , we examine the derivative of the cost function in




1 the optimal m associated with V
1
I
and m∗2 the analagous value for V
2
I . Let us redefine T
′
G(m) in equations (A.22a)–(A.22b) as











I ) (the relationship holds for any m). This holds because the
positive terms in (A.22a)–(A.22b) do not depend upon VI , but the negative terms grow in abso-






















T ′G(m,L) in an analogous fashion as we did with VI above. Inspection of (A.22a)–(A.22b) re-
veals that T ′G(m
∗
1, L
2) < T ′G(m
∗
1, L
1). This holds because H(m) increases with L. Thus as with
VI , m∗2 ≥ m∗1.
Case 3:
Next we define |v2(θ)| ≤ |v1(θ)|, so that the preferences of population 2 are not as strong as
those in population 1. As above, we associate m∗1 with population 1 and m
∗
2 with population
2 and define T ′G(m, v(·)) to depend upon the preference function v. Inspection of (A.22a)–
(A.22b) reveals that T ′G(m
∗
1, v2(·)) < T ′G(m∗1, v1(·)). This holds because the positive terms in
(A.22a)–(A.22b) decrease and the negative terms can only increase in absolute value. There-
fore, just as with VI and L, we have m∗2 ≥ m∗1.
Because SG(m∗) = W (m∗), for a fixed weighting function if m∗ is increasing then the support
SG(m
∗) must also increase. Therefore, cases 1–3 of Proposition 7 in Section 3.2.5 follow
immediately from Lemma 4. Finally, we prove case 4 of Proposition 7 below
Proof. Assume that population 1 has weighting function W1(θ) and population 2 has weighting
function W2(θ) and W2(θ) ≥ W1(θ). We first define m∗1 as the optimal m associated with
population 1. Next, define mˆ2 such that
mˆ2 = {m : W2(m) = W1(m∗1)} (A.28)
Because W2(θ) ≥ W1(θ), we have mˆ2 ≤ m∗1. We next define T ′G(m,W (·)) to denote the
explicit dependence of the derivative (A.22a)–(A.22b) upon the weighting function. By as-
sumption of the Proposition, we only need to consider the flooded case in (A.22a). We now
argue that T ′G(mˆ2,W2(·)) < T ′G(m∗1,W1(·)). This holds because by construction of mˆ2 the
negative term in (A.22a) is the same for both T ′G(mˆ2,W2(·)) and T ′G(m∗1,W1(·)). However, the
positive term −v(m) is smaller for T ′G(mˆ2,W2(·)) than for T ′G(m∗1,W1(·)), because mˆ2 ≤ m∗1
and v(·) is a decreasing function. Therefore, mˆ2 < m∗2 and W2(m∗2) ≥ W2(mˆ2) = W1(m∗1).
Recall that SG(m) = W (m), and thus we have completed the proof.
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We cannot apply the same analysis to the non-flooded case in (A.22b) because the negative term
may decrease in absolute value because of the W (v−1 (H(m))) term.
A.5 Coercion
In this section, we present the analysis on the coercion model presented in Section 3.3.
A.5.1 Max Coercion
Below is the proof of Proposition 8 in Section 3.3
Proof. In this case, if the insurgents set the coercion level to α = 1, the cost to the government
to bribe the population is (see equation (A.21a))

















v(θ)w(θ)dθ ≥ 0 (A.31)
Putting together equations (A.29)–(A.31) yields
TG(m) ≥VI + VI




Therefore, to win the government will need to execute bribes costing at least VI
1−L , and thus if
VI
1−L > VG the victory is too costly to achieve.
A.5.2 Derivative of Cost Function
In this section, we calculate the derivative T ′G(α) presented in equations (3.12a)–(3.12b) in












v(θ)w(θ)dθ − qI(α)v(m(α))w(m(α))m′(α) (A.33)
Next, observe that SG(x) = W (x) so S ′G(x) = w(x) andH




























































Equation (A.35) follows because by Proposition (5) in Section 3.2.3 either m(α) = 1
2
or m(α)
is the unique interior minimum satisfying case 2 in Proposition (5). If m(α) = 1
2
then by
Proposition 10 in Section 3.3 m′(α) = 0. If m(α) is the interior minimizer, then the term in
parentheses must be zero, because m(α) is by definition the value that makes this expression 0
(see case 2 in Proposition 5 or equation (A.22a)). Therefore, equation (A.35) holds and we can
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simplify equation (A.34d) to coincide with the derivative in (3.12a) of Section 3.3.1:








A similarly tedious exercise produces equation (3.12b) in Section 3.3.1.
A.5.3 Situational Awareness Parameter p
Below is the proof of Proposition 11 in Section 3.3.2.
Proof. First, we will rewrite the cost function in equation (3.11a) in terms of α and p:









Where m(α, p) is also a function of p. By case 3 of Lemma A.4.5, m(α, p) is nonincreasing in
p. As in Section A.5.2, we can compute the derivate of (A.37) to see how the cost varies with






v(θ)w(θ)dθ ≥ 0 (A.38)
The derivative is positive because 0 ≤ qG(α) ≤ 1 and v(θ) < 0 for θ > θN .
A.5.4 Optimal Coercion Level
Below is the proof of Proposition 12 in Section 3.3.2.
Proof. Examination of T ′G(α) in equation (3.14) reveals that the sign of the derivative is deter-
mined by the term in parentheses because q′G(α) is nonpositive. The first integral in equation
(3.14) does not depend upon α and is a positive quantity. The second integral in equation (3.14)
is negative and is nondecreasing in α (in absolute value). This follows because m(α) is non-
decreasing in α by Proposition 10 in Section 3.3.1. Thus, the term in parentheses in equation
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(3.14) is nonincreasing in α and can have at most one root (which would correspond to a lo-
cal maximum). Therefore the optimal level of coercion is this local maximum if one exists on
α ∈ (0, 1) or it is one of the boundary points α = 0 or α = 1.
A.5.5 How Coercion Varies with Other Parameters
Below is the proof of Proposition 13 in Section 3.3.2
Proof. This proof follows a very similar structure to Lemma 4
Case 1:
To see that α∗ is nonincreasing in VI we examine the derivative of the cost function in equa-




1 the optimal coercion associated with
V 1I and α
∗
2 the analogous value for V
2
I . Let us redefine m(α) and T
′
G(α) to denote the de-
pendence on VI : m(α, VI) and T ′G(α, VI). By case 1 of Lemma 4 we know that m(α, VI) is
nondecreasing in VI for a fixed α and so m(α∗1, V
1











I ) (this actually applies for all α, not just α
∗
1) because the negative term
in equation (3.14) has grown in absolute value. Because α∗2 is either a unique local maximizer or
α∗2 ∈ {0, 1} (see of Proposition 12 in Section 3.3.2) if T ′G(α∗1, V 2I ) < T ′G(α∗1, V 1I ), then α∗2 ≤ α∗1.
Case 2:
Very similar logic shows that α∗ is nondecreasing in L. We define L1 < L2, α∗1, α
∗
2 andm(α,L)
T ′G(α,L) in an analogous fashion as we did with VI above. By case 2 of Lemma 4, m(α,L
1) ≤
m(α,L2) (namely α∗1). Applying this to equation (3.14), we have that T
′
G(α,L
2) < T ′G(α,L
1)
for all α ∈ [0, 1]. By the same logic as in case 1 with VI , it must follow that α∗2 ≤ α∗1.
Case 3:
By case 3 of Lemma 4, m(α, p) is nonincreasing in p. Thus, the exact same steps can be used
as in cases 1 and 2 (except the inequalities are reversed) to show this relationship.
91
A.6 Discrete Model
The analysis for the discrete problem is much more difficult than in the continuous case. In
this section, we present potential optimization programs that could be utilized to solve for game
strategies. We examine the insurgents’ strategy in Section A.6.1 and the government’s strategy
in A.6.2.
A.6.1 Insurgents’ Response
In this section, we show that the insurgents’ low cost counter-bribe in (3.17) can be formulated
as the solution to a knapsack problem. We then present a recursive algorithm that can solve
for the cost of the insurgents’ low cost counter-bribe. We first define the discrete set BG =
{i : vi + bG(i) > 0} to be the tribes who would support the government in the absence
of a counter-bribe by the insurgents. The insurgents observe the set BG, the bribe bG(i), and
the value SG (from equation (3.15)) before they offer a counter-bribe. The insurgents need to
make a compelling counter-bribe bI(i) to a subset B′ ∈ BG such that the government has less
than L support (i.e.,
∑
i∈B\B′ wi < L), and the insurgents want to do this at the lowest cost
possible. However, we know the value of a compelling counter-bribe to any individual in BG:
bI(i) = vi + bG(i). Thus, we can eliminate the decision variable bI(i) in (3.17) by limiting





(vi + bG(i))wixi (A.39a)




xi ∈ {0, 1} (A.39c)
The optimization problem in (A.39) is an integer program and can be solved using standard
techniques (e.g., branch and bound [60]). However, it can be solved via a recursive algorithm
derived from dynamic programming as described in the next proposition
Proposition 15. We can relabel the tribes such that tribes 1, 2, . . . , |BG| are in the set BG,
which is the tribes who would support the government in the absence of a counter-bribe by the
insurgents. If F is the solution to the optimization problem in (A.39), then F = f(|BG|, SG −
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L, SG), where the function f(m,C,D) is defined below
f(m,C,D) =

0 if C ≤ 0 (A.40a)
vm + f(m− 1, C − wm, D − wm) if D − wn < C (A.40b)
min{f(m− 1, C,D − wm),
q vm + f(m− 1, C − wm, D − wm)} (A.40c)
Proof. In the classic knapsack problem, an individual chooses which of m objects to place in a
knapsack of capacity C to maximize the knapsack’s value. In the variant examined in (A.39),
and individual chooses which of N objects (i.e., tribes) to place in a knapsack to minimize the
knapsack’s value, provided the knapsack’s capacity be at least SG − L. The classic knapsack
problem has a well known recursive algorithm associated with it to compute the maximum value
[60, 61]. The recursive formula in (A.40a)–(A.40c) is similar, so we will just sketch the details.
Assume an individual has to place some collection of m objects into a knapsack to minimize
that knapsack’s value, subject to the constraint that the total weight of the knapsack be at least
C. Furthermore, the collection of objects m weighs D ≥ C. We define f(m,C,D) to be the
minimum weight associated with this problem and now argue that we can define f(m,C,D)
recursively as in (A.40a)–(A.40c). We label the objects 1 through m and we assume to start
with all of the objects are in the knapsack. The individual will remove objects one at a time,
starting from object m. in such a fashion that when the procedure finishes after the decision for
object 1, the knapsack will have the minimum weight f(m,C,D). First, we examine the base
case when C ≤ 0, in which case there is no capacity so the individual will place no objects into
the knapsack and f(m,C,D) = 0, which corresponds to (A.40a).
We next examine the case where the individual leaves objectm in the knapsack. In this case, the
value of the knapsack has increased by vm and the individual needs to fill up at least C −wm in
remaining capacity of the knapsack. As with all dynamic programming problems, we assume
the individual will make the optimal decision for objects m − 1 through 1 (which weigh a
combined D−wm). Thus if the optimal decision is to leave object m in the knapsack, we have
the following relationship
f(m,C,D) = vm + f(m− 1, C − wm, D − wm) if object m left in knapsack (A.41)
If the optimal decision is to take object m out of the knapsack, then no value is added to the
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knapsack, and a capacity C still must be filled with the remaining m− 1 objects (which weigh
D − wm). Thus, if the optimal decision is to remove object m in the knapsack, we have the
following relationship
f(m,C,D) = f(m− 1, C,D − wm) if object m removed from knapsack (A.42)
We start with D ≥ C, and at every point in the future it must be that weight of the remaining
objects be at least as much as the remaining capacity to be filled. Otherwise, the knapsack is
infeasible. Thus, if C > D − wm, then we cannot remove object m from the knapsack because
it will put us into a position of infeasibility. Therefore, we have case (A.40b), which requires us
to leave the object in the knapsack. Finally, to the general case where C ≥ D − wm. Because
the individual behaves optimally for the remaining m − 1 objects, the individual’s decision
for object m should be dictated by the smaller of equation (A.41) and (A.42). This is exactly
condition (A.40c).
Because optimization problem (A.39) is this type of knapsack problem with m = |BG|, C =
SG − L and D = SG, the lowest cost counter-bribe to the insurgents will cost f(|BG|, SG −
L, SG). For implementation purposes, one would want to use memoization to compute f(m,C,D)
to avoid solving the same subproblems many times.
A.6.2 Government’s Strategy
In this section, we derive an optimization problem to solve for the government’s low cost win-
ning bribe that is slightly more tractable than the general form presented in equation (3.18).
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wibI(i) ≤ VI (A.43c)
bI(i) ≥ (vi + bG(i))xi (A.43d)
bI(i) ≥ 0 (A.43e)
xi ∈ {0, 1} (A.43f)
Iwins ∈ {0, 1} (A.43g)
The solution to (A.43) is 1 (i.e., Iwins = 1) if and only if the insurgents can make a winning
counter-bribe to the government’s bribe bG(θ). If Iwins = 1, then by the constraint (A.43b)
the government’s support is less than L, and by constraint (A.43c) the insurgents can afford
the bribe. Therefore, the insurgents can win. Conversely, if the insurgents win, they make
a feasible bribe (which satisfies (A.43c)) and the government has less than L support (which
means the term in parentheses of (A.43b) is positive). Therefore, Iwins = 1 is a feasible, and
so the optimal value is 1. Note that this optimization problem (which has a nonlinear constraint
in (A.43b)) reveals whether the insurgents win, but does not specify the lowest cost winning
counter-bribe.
From the government’s perspective, the insurgents’ lowest cost counter-bribe is irrelevant. The
only thing that matters to the government is whether the insurgents will make a winning counter-
bribe. Thus optimization problem (A.43) is a useful starting point for the analysis of the govern-

















wibI(i) ≤ VI (A.44c)
N∑
i
wibG(i) ≤ VG (A.44d)
bI(i) ≥ (vi + bG(i))xi (A.44e)
bI(i), bG(i) ≥ 0 (A.44f)
xi, Iwins ∈ {0, 1} (A.44g)
The solution of the optimization problem in to (A.44) is 1 (i.e., Iwins = 1) if and only if the
insurgents will win the game. We discussed above that if Iwins is 1, the insurgents have a
feasible winning counter-bribe. By introducing the min term in the optimization problem, the
government desires for Iwins = 0 (i.e., the government wins). If Iwins = 0, the insurgents
cannot make a winning counter-bribe so the government wins. As above this formulation does
not give the government’s low cost winning bribe; it just specifies who will win. In many cases,
that may suffice.
To determine the government’s low cost winning bribe, we propose an iterative decomposition
algorithm. The motivation for this algorithm is the Bender’s decomposition algorithm [59].
Before formally stating the algorithm, we define the following sub and master problems. In
the sub-problem, the insurgents choose their decision variables, assuming the government’s











≥ a1 − a2 (A.45b)
N∑
i
wibI(i) ≤ VI (A.45c)
bI(i) ≥ (vi + bG(i))xi (A.45d)
bI(i) ≥ 0 (A.45e)
xi ∈ {0, 1} (A.45f)
a1, a2 ∈ {0, 1} (A.45g)
Iwins = a1 + a2 − 1 (A.45h)
Notice that this sub-problem is just a slight modification of A.43. We introduce the auxiliary
variables a1 and a2 to eliminate the non-linearity in A.43b. We will solve the subproblem
for many iterations, and after each solve we will pass the optimal value of xi to the master
problem algorithm. We define xki as the optimal xi to the sub-problem at iteration k. The



















i (1− yi), ∀ k = 1, 2, 3 . . . ` (A.46b)
bG(i) ≥ −viyi ∀ i ∈ I (A.46c)
bG(i) ≤Myi (A.46d)
bG(i) ≥ 0 ∀ i ≤ N, (A.46e)
yi ∈ {0, 1} (A.46f)
Where:
• yi is a binary variable that represents whether the government offers a bribe to tribe i.
• the set I represents tribes that have negative preferences for the government (i.e., vi < 0).
• M is a large number to ensure that bG(i) has no upper bound in a practical sense. For
example M = maxi |vi|+VI
mini wi
• k is the iteration number of the algorithm.
Constraint (A.46b) states that for any set of tribes that will support the insurgents (i.e., xki = 1),
the government must offer a bribe so that the cost to the insurgents is at least VI . This constraint




i > VI . (A.47)
Adding the axillary variable yi to ensure linearity results in the form in (A.46b). Constraint
(A.46c) specifies that if the government makes a bribe to a pro-insurgent tribe, it must be suf-
ficient to gain support from that tribe. Constraint (A.46d) creates the dependency between a
positive government bribe and yi = 1. Without this constraint. the government would set
yi = 0 for all i.
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After the sub-problem solves for an optimal xi, that vector is passed into the master problem
in the form of xki , which creates an additional constraint to (A.46b). The solution to the master
problem with this new constraint produces a government bribe that will defeat every potential
insurgent counter-bribe produced by the sub-problem up to that point in the algorithm. This
government bribe is then an input to the sub-problem on the next iteration. The algorithm
proceeds until the solution to the subproblem is Iwins = 0 (i.e., the insurgents cannot produce
a winning counter-bribe for the updated government bribe). Convergence is guaranteed to occur,
because there is no practical upper bound to the government bribe bG(i), and so eventually it
will be too costly for the insurgents to counter. Below we summarize the algorithm.
Minimum Cost Algorithm:
1. Set bG(i) = 0, k = 1 and solve the sub-problem. Store the optimal value of xi.
• If Iwins = 0 stop, set the government’s optimal bribe to b∗G(i) = 0. (Similar to
Case 1 in Section 3.2.4 of the continuous case).
• else go to step 2.
2. while Iwins = 1
• Pass the optimal solution xi of the sub-problem to the master problem as the input
xki . This adds a constraint to the master problem in (A.46b).
• Solve the master problem with this additional constraint.
• Pass the optimal solution bG(i) of the master problem as input to the sub-problem.
• Solve the sub-problem..
• Increment k by one.
• Check the value of Iwins.
When this algorithm terminates, the last optimal solution bG(i) to the master problem is the
government’s lowest cost bribe.
We conclude with the caveat that we have not had sufficient time to properly vet this algorithm.
It is based on the principles of the Bender’s decomposition algorithm [59], produces the correct
answer for small verifiable test cases, and appears to produce reasonable solutions for larger
problems. However, a more rigorous analysis of this algorithm must be undertaken.
99
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
100
Initial Distribution List
1. Defense Technical Information Center
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia
2. Dudly Knox Library
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California











6. Kara Harp Okulu Kutuphanesi
Bakanlıklar - 06100
Ankara, TURKEY
7. Savunma Bilimleri Enstitusu
Kara Harp Okulu
Bakanlıklar, Ankara, TURKEY
8. Bilkent University Library
Bilkent Universitesi
Ankara, TURKEY
101
